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Malawi is characterised in food security discourse as a paradigmatic case of incipient malthusian 
crisis in rural Africa. Malawians enjoy few employment alternatives to agriculture, economic 
liberalisation has created new patterns of opportunity for some but increased marginalisation for 
others, and the government’s traditional policy commitment to national self-sufficiency in staple 
cereals is increasingly unsustainable in a context of rapid population growth, rising input costs and 
recurrent drought. Responses to this crisis have been pragmatic but short-termist. Malawi’s ‘green 
revolution’ - hybrid maize promotion - is intended to maintain self-sufficiency indefinitely, but 
only delays the inevitable day when Malawi, failing an unprecedented structural transformation of 
the economy based on diversification away from agriculture, becomes permanently dependent on 
massive inflows of aid to bridge chronic food production deficits. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Rural Malawians face various categories of food insecurity, both short-term (transitory or seasonal) 
and long-term (chronic). An estimated 30% of the rural population live below the ‘calorie needs 
line’, while over 40% are unable to acquire a ‘basic needs’ basket of essential goods and services. 
Most of these households cultivate very small landholdings, many are female-centred with high 
dependency ratios, and the majority live in the densely populated south. 
 
Three strands of the food security discourse in Malawi are identified in this paper. The national 
self-sufficiency approach emphasises raising food production through hybrid maize promotion, 
market liberalisation favours price incentives to encourage diversification into export crops, while 
a concern with household food security motivates targeted ‘safety nets’ for the poor. None of these 
approaches adequately addresses the critical issue of non-agricultural employment creation, so they 
do not offer sustainable solutions to the deepening livelihood crisis facing Malawi’s smallholders. 
 
National self-sufficiency in staple foods has been promoted since early colonial times, for strategic 
and economic imperatives. Malawi being landlocked and agriculturally based, logic dictates that 
foreign exchange spending on food imports be minimised. Rapid population growth (currently 
3.3% per annum), encroachment of estates (which cover 9% of total land area, and 25% of the 
relatively fertile Central Region) onto customary land, and declining soil fertility (increasing 
cultivation of marginal land) mean that maintaining self-sufficiency requires intensification. In 
response, the Ministry of Agriculture has promoted hybrid maize adoption and fertiliser use to raise 
yields. Subsidies and credit for inputs, and even free distribution of seed and fertiliser, have 
encouraged a concentration on maize production by smallholders. However, subsidies are 
extremely expensive, free input distribution is fiscally unsustainable, and crop production is 
frequently undermined by agricultural droughts. 
 
Supporters of market liberalisation argue that market forces will raise smallholder incomes by 
increased production of high-value crops such as tobacco, cotton and soybean. Increased wealth 
will trickle down to the rural poor through multiplier effects such as rising demand for labour, local 
spending and remittances. Critics argue that liberalisation accelerates processes of rural economic 
differentiation - higher input prices exclude the poor from taking advantage of higher output prices, 
while higher food prices threaten food security in production deficit households. Government has 
responded by retaining a food security function for the restructured parastatal (ADMARC). Some 
vi 
donors are pressuring for full and rapid liberalisation, but the private sector remains weak and there 
is evidence that traders are either exploiting or neglecting smallholders in remote areas. 
 
The household food security focus reflects a recognition that smallholders are highly stratified, and 
that the poorest are suffering as their landholdings shrink and their incomes are squeezed by market 
liberalisation. Recent surveys reveal that poor households in Malawi survive by diversifying their 
sources of food and income. This suggests that interventions should encourage crop diversification 
rather than monocropping either hybrid maize or an export crop, in conjunction with diversification 
outside agriculture (off-farm employment as an alternative to low paid agricultural labouring). 
Employment-creating ‘safety nets’ such as public works projects are one option in the short term, 
but they are limited in scale and duration. In the long run, sustainable household food security can 
be guaranteed only if additional livelihoods are found that provide adequate and reliable off-farm 
incomes for Malawi’s marginal smallholders. 
 
 
1 
HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN MALAWI 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A fierce and urgent debate is underway in Malawi over the fundamental policy question of how to 
ensure that national food security is maintained and household food security guaranteed for all 
Malawians, not just now but in the medium to long-term future. The debate is fierce because it is 
ideological as much as pragmatic, and it is urgent because available evidence suggests that poverty 
and food insecurity are rising among the majority of smallholders who are increasingly unable to 
meet their subsistence needs though self-provisioning, due to constrained access to natural 
resources and agricultural inputs. 
 
A recent review of the food security discourse in Malawi led to the identification of three broad 
positions held by the key players - Government, donors and NGOs.1 Each position embodies a 
theory of the causes of food insecurity, and each suggests very different policy interventions. To 
summarise in one sentence: the national self-sufficiency approach concentrates on raising maize 
production for national food security; market liberalisation introduces price incentives to increase 
smallholder incomes through diversification into high-value crops; while a concern with household 
food security requires targeted resource transfers (of inputs, food and income) to the poor. Each 
approach is associated with its own champions. The Government of Malawi has long been (and still 
is) committed to national food self-sufficiency; major donors (especially the Americans) are 
pushing hard for full liberalisation of the agricultural sector; and local and international NGOs seem 
to be most directly concerned about the welfare of the ‘poorest of the poor’. 
 
Of course, this is a simplified representation of a complex debate, and positions are evolving all the 
time. The present Government of Malawi, for example, professes a commitment to market 
liberalisation2 - but to some extent this position has been forced upon them, and an interventionist 
promotion of national self-sufficiency would probably continue to be the government’s preferred 
position, if they had unlimited resources and a completely free hand. Similarly, USAID has lent its 
support to safety nets for household food security, but its dominant position is a radical ‘Market-
Oriented Approach to Food Security’ (Brown et al. 1996). 
                                                          
1 This categorisation, and the discussion which follows, was developed in Devereux (1996). 
2 See, for example, the Minister’s Foreword to the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development’s 
1995 strategy document: “For efficient resource allocation, Government will continue to rely on the 
market mechanism with minimum intervention” (MoALD 1995:i). 
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Also, although market liberalisation has been accepted as a fact of life by all the major stakeholders 
in Malawi, there are deep divisions in attitudes towards its implementation. Even within the donor 
community, two approaches can be delineated: the ‘American school’ (USAID, World Bank) and 
the ‘European school’ (EU, DfID, WFP). In the more radical ‘American’ view, all agricultural input 
and output markets should be fully liberalised as rapidly as possible. In the more cautious 
‘European’ view, liberalisation should be slower and carefully phased, its impact should be closely 
monitored at each stage, and safety nets must be put in place to protect the poor, whose 
vulnerability might well intensify during the process.3 
 
The following discussion elaborates and critiques each of the three strands of the discourse 
identified above, focusing on the impact of key policy reforms on the food security of Malawi’s 
poorest households, most of whom are located in the smallholder rural areas. 
 
2. NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY 
The evolving food security debate during the 1970s and 1980s led to a recognition that national 
food security does not require individual countries to achieve food production self-sufficiency. 
Depending on each country’s factor endowments, a more lucrative and perhaps even safer option 
might be to produce and export high-value crops or manufactured goods, and to purchase some 
proportion of national staple food requirements on world markets. Many African governments were 
suspicious of this view, however, fearing dependence on the international grain trade and aware 
that their most food insecure citizens are typically smallholder farmers who grow food for 
subsistence and who would be unable to access or afford food imported commercially at the 
national level. These governments retained a commitment to national self-sufficiency, and their 
food security policies - unless and until modified or reversed by structural adjustment 
programmes - were characterised by strongly interventionist support for both food producers and 
food consumers: input subsidies, panterritorial and panseasonal pricing, food price subsidies, 
control of grain marketing through parastatals, often backed by legislation against private traders. 
Malawi under Dr Banda was no exception to this pattern - on the contrary, it was archetypal. 
 
                                                          
3  A June 1996 Memorandum from ODA to USAID, commenting on the ‘Market-Oriented Approach to 
Food Security in Malawi’, epitomises this distinction between the ‘European’ and the ‘American’ 
approach. The Memorandum states: “As you know, there are a number of points in the report with 
which USAID and ODA are not in accord. ....we feel that even if we accept the premise of the market-
based destination - which of course broadly we do - the paper does not set out a route for getting from 
where we are to where we eventually want to be” [emphases added]. 
Household Food Security in Malawi 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3 
2.1. The Case For National Self-Sufficiency in Malawi 
The drive for self-sufficiency has been a feature of government food security policy in Malawi 
since the early colonial period. Writing of the 1930s, Msukwa (in Berry and Petty, 1992:2) 
observes that: “The implicit assumption of the Government appears to have been that increased 
food consumption would result from increased production leading thus to good nutrition. 
Government effort was therefore mostly directed at increased overall production of the staple, 
maize, and export crops such as tea and tobacco.” 
 
As a landlocked country with most of its population engaged in smallholder agriculture, it might 
seem logical that Malawi should at least meet its food consumption requirements through domestic 
production. “Agriculture is the most important sector of the Malawian economy. In normal years it 
contributes more than one-third of GDP and over 90% of export earnings, employs almost half of 
those in paid employment and supports at least 85% of the population” (EIU 1996:17). The 1992 
drought caused an estimated 7.9% fall in real GDP, through its effect on agricultural output - both 
food and export crops. Food deficits expose Malawi to high costs in foreign exchange of importing 
grain, and to the risks associated with dependence on world markets or aid donors. It is estimated 
that the costs of importing maize through Mozambique are almost three times the cost of producing 
maize locally. Transport costs were even higher during the 1980s war in Mozambique, when all 
imports and exports had to be routed through Dar-es-Salaam or Durban. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, since independence in 1964, the Government of Malawi (GoM) 
has consistently equated national food security with maize production self-sufficiency. In most 
years Malawi can be described as self-sufficient at the national level. Discounting drought events, 
production of maize and other major food crops (millet, sorghum, rice, wheat, cassava, beans, 
groundnuts) has risen steadily over the past thirty years, though not fast enough to keep pace with 
population growth. A generally improving aggregate production has been accompanied by steadily 
falling per capita availability. While total food crop production rose by 28% from the early 1970s to 
the late 1980s, Table 1 reveals a decline of approximately 23% in per capita production over the 
same period. (Figures in parentheses give percentage change over the previous half decade.) 
 
The government of Malawi did not spell out specific food security policies until it published a Food 
Security and Nutrition Policy Statement in 1990, as a ‘Supplement’ to the Statement of 
Development Policies of 1987. The 1990 document differentiates between two categories of food 
insecure smallholder households: those farming less than half a hectare (estimated at 41% of 
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smallholders), for whom “targeted income transfers” would be needed to protect household food 
security in the short term; and those farming between half a hectare and one hectare (estimated at 
31% (World Bank 1996:37)), who are characterised as being potentially self-sufficient if their 
agricultural productivity is improved. It is at the latter category of ‘medium smallholders’ that the 
drive for hybrid maize adoption is being targeted, while the former category of ‘very small 
smallholders’ is effectively written off as needing transfers and safety nets simply to survive. 
However, the ‘medium smallholders’ are also the group who are being encouraged to grow export 
crops like tobacco and cotton, and yet the numbers of households moving from the ‘medium’ to 
‘very small’ category is rising steadily, as the Malthusian logic of population growth grinds out its 
vicious cycle of subdivision towards ever smaller parcels of land. 
 
  Table 1.  Total and Per Capita Food Production in Malawi, 1970-1990 
Years Average Annual Food 
Production (MT) 
Kilograms per 
person per year
Kilocalories per 
person per day 
1970-1974 1,269,611                 270                2,653                
1975-1979 1,406,072  (+11%) 253    (-6%) 2,482    (-6%) 
1980-1984 1,429,844   (+2%)  220  (-13%) 2,184  (-12%) 
1985-1989 1,630,376  (+14%) 211    (-4%) 2,040    (-6%) 
  Source:  Calculated from UN/GoM 1993:108;  IFAD 1993:8. 
 
The UDF government, elected in 1994, is in the process of formulating a new development 
programme (‘2020 Vision’), and a revised Food Security and Nutrition Policy document was 
anticipated - but not finalised - by mid-1997. The most recent statement of the Government’s 
position on rural food security can be found in the 1995 Development Strategy and Action Plan of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development (MoALD). In his Foreword, the Minister 
notes that the overall objective of the strategy is “rural poverty reduction”. Under this overall goal, 
three subsidiary objectives are listed, the first being: “Improving food self-sufficiency and the 
nutritional status of the population” (GoM 1995a:1). Food security is never mentioned as a strategic 
objective in its own right. The document argues that food production in Malawi must grow at over 
4% per annum, because of high population growth (3.3% p.a.), rapid urbanisation (6.7% p.a.), 
widespread malnutrition which cannot be redressed through food purchases because of poverty, and 
high costs of importing food. Since land is in short supply, food production increases must be 
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achieved primarily through productivity rises. This, it is argued, will improve both national food 
self-sufficiency and household food security. 
 
Like most strategy documents, this document is strong on good intentions but weak on details. It is 
also internally contradictory. Smallholders are encouraged simultaneously to raise maize 
productivity through adoption of hybrid varieties, for national food self-sufficiency goals; to grow a 
more diversified range of food crops, including secondary crops such as cassava, for household 
food security in drought years; and to adopt tobacco as a cash crop in order to raise incomes and 
reduce rural poverty (GoM 1995a:2). There is little recognition of the trade-offs required, both 
within the Ministry’s budget but especially within smallholder households, between these 
alternative strategies. For most smallholders facing binding land, labour and capital constraints it is 
simply not possible to grow hybrid maize, secondary food crops and export crops like tobacco or 
cotton. 
 
Ultimately, despite repeated mentions of crop diversification, the Ministry of Agriculture’s strategy 
document of 1995 perpetuates dependence on hybrid maize. The strategy fails to consider the 
impact of the collapsed credit scheme and escalating input prices on the uptake of hybrid seed and 
fertiliser, but these developments (discussed below) severely undermine the objective of achieving 
sustainable productivity increases in smallholder agriculture. 
 
• Hybrid maize promotion 
If food security through self-sufficiency is an explicit objective at any level, from a farm household 
to a nation, only two responses are possible to population growth and food production deficits: 
extensive and intensive increases in food production.4 In Malawi, where the extensive margin of 
cultivation has effectively been reached in many rural areas, as is evident in rapidly dwindling farm 
sizes and the virtual elimination of fallowing, attention is increasingly turning to intensification, 
specifically by raising the productivity of smallholder food production through the promotion of 
hybrid maize varieties in conjunction with chemical fertiliser use. The implicit model driving this 
strategy to maintain self-sufficiency is the FAO-inspired ‘input-output’ approach, which treats 
agriculture as a kind of production line, where inputs introduced at one end (land, labour, seeds, 
                                                          
4 A more radical diagnosis would require accepting that self-sufficiency is either infeasible or 
non-optimal for Malawi, and focusing instead on strategies to earn income which can be used to 
purchase food from surplus producing households or countries elsewhere. Given the dearth of viable 
alternatives to agriculture, this option leads inevitably down the path of export cropping, which simply 
substitutes one form of land and labour utilisation (food crop production) for another more lucrative 
but equally risky activity - and one that is, arguably, equally unsustainable in the long run. 
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fertiliser, water) determine the amount of output harvested at the other end. In a context of limited 
land but steadily increasing demand for food, maintaining national self-sufficiency requires 
pumping yield-enhancing inputs into agriculture that will raise the productivity of the scarce 
resource - arable land. 
 
There is a broad consensus within the ‘national self-sufficiency’ school of thought that, with rapid 
ongoing population growth, self-sufficiency can now be maintained only through widespread 
adoption of hybrid maize. “When Malawi’s population was substantially smaller, good weather 
basically assured a good maize crop and national food security. .... With a population of over 
10 million, food security now requires not only good weather but substantial quantities of fertilised 
hybrid maize” (Mann 1995:5). If significant hectarages of high yielding hybrids were not planted, 
Malawi “would be in structural food deficit each year” (Henry 1996:4). 
 
White maize is Malawi’s staple food crop, accounting for three out of every four hectares of land 
planted by smallholders, up from 58% in 1980/81 and 70% in 1990/91 (UN/GoM 1993:107). In 
1990, Malawi’s per capita consumption of maize as food was the highest in the world (Smale 
1995:820).5 Until the late 1980s, local varieties were predominant, accounting for over 90% of 
maize hectarage, with only 6% planted to hybrids - which were adopted mainly by the 25% of 
larger smallholders whose landholdings exceeded 1.5 hectares (Sahn and van Frausum 1994:420). 
 
Hybrid maize offers superior yields over local and composite varieties. According to a Ministry of 
Agriculture survey, smallholder maize yields average 800-1,000 kg/ha for local varieties, 1,200-
1,800 kg/ha for composites and 2,600-3,000 kg/ha for hybrids (GoM 1993:10). Smallholder 
adoption of hybrids was slow initially, but has accelerated in the last decade, with the development 
of semi-flint (rather than previously promoted dent) varieties which compare favourably with local 
maize in terms of their processing and on-farm storage characteristics, and which appear to offer 
higher yields under all scenarios, including low rainfall and lack of fertiliser. Even in the drought 
year of 1992, yields of hybrid maize were higher than local varieties, whether fertilisers were 
applied or not. Between 1988 and 1992, the proportion of smallholder maize area planted to hybrids 
rose from 7% to 24%, causing an exponential increase in the contribution of hybrids to total  
                                                          
5  This reflects a strong preference for white maize as the staple food by Malawians, as reflected in the 
local saying: “If you have not eaten nsima [maize porridge] today, you have not eaten.” Unfortunately, 
this preference contributes to high levels of undernutrition among Malawi’s children, because nsima’s 
low energy density (0.95 kcal/gm) makes it difficult for children to eat the bulk required for adequate 
nutrition, even when maize is plentiful (Cammack 1996:29). 
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smallholder maize output, from 11% to 50%. Over the period 1987 to 1993, average smallholder 
maize yields improved by 50%, prompting talk of Malawi’s “delayed Green Revolution” (Smale 
1995). In May 1996, the Ministry of Agriculture’s National Crop Estimates forecast that 29% of 
maize hectarage was hybrid and that this would contribute 52% of the imminent maize harvest, as 
opposed to the 69% planted to local varieties, which would contribute only 47% (Earl and Moseley 
1996:106). 
 
On the other hand, this higher percentage contribution was made to a greatly reduced total in 
drought years. National maize production in 1992 was substantially lower than in non-drought 
years,6 so that as a national food security strategy the concentration on maize self-sufficiency has 
proved to be highly risky. Besides, it must be emphasised that these dramatic figures were not 
entirely demand driven, but reflected a concerted policy by government, with donor support, of 
promoting the development of hybrid maize varieties and increasing their accessibility to 
smallholders, through subsidised seed and fertiliser prices and the provision of agricultural credit 
tied to purchases of these inputs. As will be seen, while the rhetorical commitment to hybrid maize 
promotion remains, government capacity to deliver subsidised inputs to farmers has been severely 
eroded over the past decade, so that access to hybrid maize has been effectively denied to the 
poorest smallholders, who need it most. 
 
• Smallholder credit programmes 
The Smallholder Agricultural Credit Association (SACA) was established within MoALD in 1988. 
Loans were made to small groups of smallholders who organised themselves into ‘farmers clubs’ 
and stood security for each other’s loans. In the early 1990s SACA reached over 30% of Malawian 
smallholders. Despite this impressive coverage, it should be noted that data on the gender 
distribution of these loans provides clear evidence of discrimination against women. Although 
about 70% of Malawi’s full-time smallholder farmers are female, only 30% of SACA loans in 1993 
were made to women (IFAD 1993:7). 
 
Initially, during the 1980s, recovery rates on loans were extraordinarily high, at well over 90%. But 
in the early 1990s SACA began to experience severe loan recovery problems, especially after the 
drought of 1991/92, when the collapse of maize production caused widespread defaults and 
precipitated the demise of SACA in 1994. But drought was not the only reason. SACA was also 
                                                          
6 At 657,000 MT, the 1992 maize harvest was less than half the 1991 output of 1,589,000 MT, and less 
than one-third the record harvest of 2,009,000 MT achieved in 1993 (see also Table 2 below). 
1 
heavily politicised, being closely associated with Dr Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Party 
officials were involved in selecting farmers’ club members and in recovering loans - expropriation 
of assets being the most effective method used, in conjunction with peer pressure among group 
members, to keep repayment rates high. Rising defaults in the early 1990s reflected to some extent 
growing disillusion with the MCP as the political climate in Malawi started to change. Following 
the bumper 1992/93 agricultural season, when approximately 400,000 farmers from more than 
15,000 farmers clubs received seasonal credit, only 13% of the loans disbursed were recovered 
(Msukwa et al. 1994). Default rates accelerated as Malawi moved towards multiparty democracy, 
when some opposition politicians promised to write off agricultural loans if elected. 
 
In 1994, when the MCP government was replaced by the democratically elected UDF, SACA was 
converted into a private company, the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), which is managed 
on purely commercial lines, and currently provides credit to farmers through 15,000 farmers’ clubs, 
reaching almost 35% of smallholders. However, the MRFC has more stringent eligibility criteria 
than SACA. Only smallholders who had never defaulted on SACA loans were deemed eligible to 
receive MRFC loans, which undoubtedly contributed to high recovery rates in the first season 
(Pearce et al. 1996:12), but also excluded the most financially insecure smallholders. 
 
Recently, USAID and IFAD have each initiated smallholder credit programmes aimed at raising 
agricultural production. The USAID project explicitly targets ‘better off’ smallholders, on the 
grounds that these are the farmers who are most likely to produce surpluses. The IFAD project 
targets much poorer farmers, but a requirement for access to credit is that farmers must plant maize 
(for self-sufficiency), as well as soybeans and tobacco (to generate cash income to repay loans). 
This conditionality continues the long tradition in Malawi of using the provision of agricultural 
inputs to manipulate smallholders’ cropping decisions. 
 
• Fertiliser subsidies 
The Government of Malawi has consistently promoted fertiliser adoption for national food self-
sufficiency objectives, and it steadfastly resisted World Bank pressure to abolish fertiliser subsidies 
during the 1980s - a decade in which, despite the subsidies, fertiliser prices to farmers more than 
quadrupled. Evidence suggests that access to yield-enhancing inputs has always been highly 
unequal within the smallholder subsector. The Ministry of Agriculture’s Annual Survey of 1984/85 
found that the 55% of farmers who cultivated under 1 hectare used less than 5% of all fertilisers 
sold to smallholders (World Bank 1995:14). As a result of this skewed access, and notwithstanding 
steadily rising fertiliser purchases by farmers throughout the 1980s, fertiliser use in Malawi is low, 
Household Food Security in Malawi 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2 
at 20kg per hectare of arable land in 1991, compared to 48 kg/ha in Kenya, 61 kg/ha in Zimbabwe, 
and a phenomenal 278 kg/ha in China (Donovan 1995:9). 
 
The implicit assumption underpinning fertiliser subsidies and the Supplementary Inputs Project 
(discussed below) is that smallholders face constraints which limit their access to yield-enhancing 
agricultural inputs, specifically, to hybrid maize seeds and fertilisers. The World Bank (1995:58) 
argues that it is essential to increase fertiliser use by smallholders, because “the land constraint 
makes agricultural intensification imperative”, but the Bank also argues against fertiliser subsidies: 
“such subsidisation could encourage ‘leakage’ of fertilisers to the estate subsector and neighbouring 
countries”. The phasing out of fertiliser subsidies, which was completed by 1995, was justified on 
the grounds that farmers would respond to market incentives such as higher producer prices for 
maize.7 
 
On the other hand, recent surveys - for instance, by Save the Children Fund (Pearce et al. 1996) - 
suggest that the major constraint faced by smallholders in Malawi may be family labour, rather than 
seeds and fertilisers, or even access to land (see below). If this is true, then more creative solutions 
to household food insecurity are needed than simply providing agricultural inputs - such as 
providing viable off-farm incomes to raise and stabilise the returns to rural labour. 
 
• Supplementary Inputs Project 
In 1992/93, 1994/95 and again in 1995/96, the Government of Malawi, with financial support from 
ODA (now DfID) and implementation support from ActionAid-Malawi, distributed free maize seed 
to smallholder farmers throughout Malawi. The Supplementary Inputs Project (‘SIP’) aimed to 
increase access to hybrid seed and fertilisers for smallholders. This was in recognition of the fact 
that average smallholder maize yields improved by 50% between 1987 and 1993 - excluding 
drought years - mainly due to increased adoption of hybrid maize, from 3% to 25% of total maize 
area planted. However, it was also recognised that low incomes excluded the majority of 
smallholders from adopting hybrid maize, because they could not afford to purchase seeds and 
fertilisers at a time when their incomes were contracting due to drought, and input subsidies were 
being rapidly phased out. 
                                                          
7 As a possible alternative to subsidies or free distribution of inputs, targeted grants of fertilisers and 
seeds could be given to smallholders farming, say, less than 1 hectare, in the form of vouchers, so as 
not to undermine private traders. Targeting costs could be reduced through a self-selecting procedure 
such as fertiliser-for-work, or ‘fertiliser-for-training’ - attending agricultural extension sessions - 
though this proposal could be accused of perpetuating conditionality and paternalism in agricultural 
policy interventions. 
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The first SIP was designed primarily as a post-drought recovery intervention, and focused on 
household food security objectives. In 1992/93, following the drought which halved the national 
harvest, 12,500 MT of local maize seed was distributed in 10kg packs to 1.3 million smallholders in 
drought-affected areas. Most beneficiaries were located in the Southern Region (723,000 
households), followed by the Central Region (409,000) and the North (128,000) (Malindi 1996:6). 
This was in addition to 400 MT of maize distributed as emergency food aid. Even though no hybrid 
maize seeds or fertilisers were distributed, it is estimated that this intervention contributed 
290,000 MT towards the record harvest of over 2 million MT in 1993, and that its impact was 
especially beneficial on poorer households for whom access to seeds after the drought was 
problematic (Henry 1996:14). 
 
The second Supplementary Inputs Project, in 1994/95, was as much a response to the collapsed 
smallholder credit scheme and rising input prices as to the 1993/94 drought, which was less severe 
than in 1991/92. This time the intervention followed a mixed strategy, aimed at promoting both 
national and household food security objectives, by making hybrid seed and fertilisers accessible to 
smallholders who were excluded by poverty from planting hybrid maize. Accordingly, 5kg of 
hybrid seed plus fertiliser was distributed to 800,000 farmers in drought-affected areas, mainly in 
southern Malawi, and a further 160,000 farmers received a similar package of inputs in high 
potential areas of central and northern Malawi (Henry and Mkamanga 1995). This intervention 
contributed an estimated 225,000 MT to the harvest in 1995 (GoM 1995b:8). Limited amounts of 
sorghum seed, cassava and sweet potato cuttings were also distributed in the drier southern 
districts, these crops being more drought-tolerant than maize. 
 
In 1995/96 an almost identical strategy was adopted, with the same mixed objectives, but without 
drought as a trigger. Instead, the intervention was justified as a response to the high input prices 
associated with the Fertiliser Subsidy Removal Programme (FSRP), which threatened to reduce 
hybrid maize planting to such an extent that national self-sufficiency would be unattainable even 
with good rains. A total of 460,000 farmers in marginal areas and 200,000 farmers in higher yield 
areas received hybrid seed and fertiliser. The project raised total maize hectarage planted to hybrid 
by one-third, and its incremental impact on Malawi’s 1996 maize harvest of 1.6 million MT is 
estimated at 10%, or 160,000 MT (Henry 1996:21). 
 
The second and third Supplementary Inputs Projects differed slightly from the first SIP, because 
they followed the ‘mixed strategy’ described above, reflecting the very different priorities of 
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government and donors. Given the government’s overarching concern with national food self-
sufficiency, the logical target for yield-enhancing inputs is farmers in high-yielding agricultural 
areas. But poverty and food insecurity in Malawi are concentrated in agriculturally marginal areas, 
in the Southern Region and along the shores of Lake Malawi. Donors and NGOs argued for 
targeting free inputs on these chronically food deficit areas as a household food security measure, 
even though these one-off interventions address only transitory food insecurity at the household 
level and do little for chronic food insecurity (unless they are repeated every year) or for national 
self-sufficiency in the long run. 
 
The productivity impact of the SIPs was less than 100% to the extent that the inputs were diverted 
to other uses. Because of the nature of food insecurity in Malawi, poor households raun out of food 
long before inputs were distributed, so some smallholders sold fertilisers and consumed seeds 
instead of planting them. Estimated leakages to estates of fertilisers targeted at smallholders during 
the 1980s ranged from 30% to 50% (Sahn and van Frausum 1994:429), and it is known that some 
of the fertilisers given out under the SIP was sold to estates. For better-off farmers who used their 
free inputs as intended, the SIP raised their productivity and improved their future food security, 
but for marginal farmers who faced seasonal food and cash crises, the annual consumption gap 
provided an incentive to consume or monetise inputs, rather than invest them in the next year’s 
harvest. Either way, the distribution of seeds and fertilisers certainly contributed to reducing food 
production gaps in beneficiary households, at least in the short term. 
 
Although the free distribution of hybrid seed and fertilisers to drought-affected deficit smallholders 
provided a one-off boost to maize production and contributed to good harvests in both 1995 and 
1996, the fact that these inputs need to be purchased every year means that there is little sustainable 
impact on food security in those households which are unable to purchase inputs unless they are at 
least heavily subsidised. It has therefore been argued that the Supplementary Inputs Project, if 
repeated in future years, should focus instead on national food security objectives by targeting high 
yielding areas and farmers, and make no attempt at achieving household food security goals in 
marginal areas as well (Henry 1996). After all, producing maize surpluses keeps the Strategic Grain 
Reserve well stocked, eliminates the need to import food and keeps maize prices down to 
affordable levels for poor consumers. Household food security in marginal agricultural areas should 
be supported by mechanisms and interventions that focus on raising cash incomes rather than maize 
production. 
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It is an intriguing paradox that, although the major donors are opposed to ‘market distorting’ 
interventions such as input or food price subsidies, they supported the free distribution of inputs 
under all three SIPs, on the basis that these were drought rehabilitation measures (ODA and the 
EU’s view), which could also be characterised as a ‘safety net’ support to poor smallholders (the 
World Bank and USAID position). At the macroeconomic level, the donors also recognised that the 
structural adjustment programme would be derailed if the Government of Malawi was forced to 
divert scarce foreign exchange reserves to importing food. From this perspective, the donors could 
justifiably be accused of opportunism - implicitly devolving responsibility onto NGOs like 
ActionAid and Save the Children Fund for vital welfarist functions, following a livelihoods crisis 
which the donors may have been partly responsible for creating - and in fact there is an ongoing 
debate within these NGOs about the extent to which they are simply ‘applying plasters’ to the deep 
economic and social wounds which structural adjustment is inflicting on Malawi’s rural poor. 
 
2.2. The Case Against National Food Self-Sufficiency in Malawi 
There are two important reasons for arguing that the emphasis on national food self-sufficiency is 
becoming increasingly difficult to justify and achieve in Malawi. These two arguments can be 
expressed in the form of propositions. The first is that national food self-sufficiency does not 
guarantee household food security, and the second is that self-sufficiency may be unsustainable in 
the long run because of population growth and natural resource constraints. 
 
•  National food self-sufficiency does not guarantee household food security 
In terms of agricultural policy, national food security can best be stimulated by targeting inputs on 
more productive farmers living in more fertile areas, since this maximises national output, yields 
per unit of land and marketed surpluses. By contrast, household food security is best enhanced by 
targeting inputs on the poorest farmers living in the most marginal areas, since this should promote 
the achievement of self-sufficiency at household level in chronically food deficit households. This 
policy dilemma has recently generated a growing literature on the debate over “high potential 
versus low potential areas” (Maxwell 1996), which is sometimes characterised - simplistically - as a 
trade-off between efficiency and equity objectives. 
 
Almost half of Malawi’s maize harvest is produced by just two of the country’s eight Agricultural 
Development Districts - Kasungu and Lilongwe ADDs - both in Central Region (GoM 1995b:3). 
However, the majority of Malawi’s food insecure citizens and two-thirds of households classified 
as poor live in the densely populated Southern Region. A focus on national self-sufficiency would 
imply neglecting these marginal households and targeting yield-enhancing inputs on the Central 
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Region, in the interests of maximising the productivity impact of agricultural programmes and 
minimising the national food import requirement.8 
 
  Table 2.  National Food Production and Consumption Requirements in Malawi, 1987-1995 
Agricultural 
Year 
Total Food 
Production (MT)
Total Food Energy 
Requirements (MT)
Total Food Energy 
Surplus or Deficit (MT)
1987/88 1,788,392 1,831,465    - 43,073 
1988/89 1,906,341 1,887,021    + 19,320 
1989/90 1,686,903 1,949,293    - 262,390  
1990/91 2,033,838 2,013,619    + 20,219 
1991/92    878,705 2,085,451 - 1,206,746  
1992/93 2,563,361 2,100,019   + 463,341 
1993/94 1,290,258 2,169,320    - 879,062 
1994/95 1,882,374 2,240,910    - 358,536 
     Source:   Compiled from Johnson 1996, Tables 11-14, pp.40-42. 
     Notes:     1. All figures have been converted into maize equivalent metric tons (MT). 
2. ‘Total food production’ includes cereals (maize, rice, sorghum, millet, wheat), tubers (potatoes, 
cassava) and pulses (groundnuts, beans). 
3. ‘Total food energy requirements’ are based on a per capita consumption requirement of 220 
maize equivalent kilograms of food per annum. 
4. ‘Total food energy surplus or deficit’ is simply the aggregate difference between production and 
requirements. 
 
Whichever strategy is preferred - and there are persuasive arguments on both sides - Malawi 
remains vulnerable to rainfall variability. During the 1990s, food production has been characterised 
by great volatility around a generally rising trend (see Table 2). Record harvests in 1991, 1993 and 
                                                          
8 Maxwell (1996) argues for a combination of strategies, rather than exclusive adoption of one or the 
other. The reduction of chronic household food insecurity should be prioritised by policymakers, but 
some resources should also be directed at high potential areas - a strategy which is described as 
“walking on two legs but with one leg longer than the other”. 
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1996 (over 2 million metric tons in each year) have been punctuated by devastating droughts in 
1992 and 1994, and inadequate harvests in 1990 and 1995. 
 
In only three of the eight years from 1988 to 1995 was Malawi self-sufficient in major food crops. 
In two of the five deficit years - the agricultural drought events of 1991/92 and 1993/94 - the ‘food 
gap’ was very large indeed. In 1991/92 production met only 42% of national consumption needs. 
 
Because Malawi relies on rainfed agriculture for both food security and export income, droughts 
constitute a double shock on national entitlements to food - increasing the need for costly food 
imports while simultaneously reducing the foreign exchange earnings available to purchase this 
food commercially.9 In 1994, for instance, when maize production fell by 48% from its record 1993 
level, tobacco output (which accounts for 70% of agricultural exports) fell by 28%.10 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of national food production in Malawi, year by year. Every harvest is 
treated separately, as though there is no carry-over from a bad season to the next harvest. But this 
‘food gap’ approach suffers from short-termism. After the 1991/92 drought, 1992/93 yielded a 
bumper harvest of over two million metric tons - but sales of produce were much lower than 
expected. The explanation has two parts, both related to household coping strategies. Firstly, 
households which rationed consumption and went hungry during 1992 started consuming green 
maize early in 1993 - and consuming more than usual, partly to compensate for earlier reduced food 
intake and partly because more green maize needs to be cooked than matured maize to produce an 
equivalent amount of food - so that the actual harvest in May-June 1993 was lower than total 
production figures suggest.11 Secondly, households incurred debts during the drought period (for 
food purchases, farming expenses, malnourished children falling ill and needing treatment) which 
they could not afford, so paid on credit against sales of maize after the harvest, or even pledged this 
crop to their debtors (Pearce et al. 1996). The 1996 maize harvest was also estimated at over two 
million metric tons, which is more than adequate for national self-sufficiency. Nonetheless, severe 
                                                          
9 Note also that devaluation under structural adjustment has raised the foreign exchange costs of 
importing food (and fuel for transporting food) dramatically. The Kwacha/US Dollar exchange rate 
depreciated from 0.81 in 1980 to 4.2 in 1995 (Donovan 1995:39). 
10 Malawi’s main agricultural exports (by value) in 1994 were: tobacco 70.1%; tea 7.5%; sugar 7.4%; 
coffee 4.1%; cotton 0.5% (EIU 1996:17). 
11 Consumption of premature or green maize can start as early as December. It has the positive effect of 
shifting the ‘hungry season’ back by two or three months but the negative consequence of causing 
granary stocks to be depleted earlier the following year (Pearce et al. 1996:60). On the other hand, 
Peters (1996a:4) cautions that virtually all farming households sample their ‘green maize’ even in good 
years, so that this behaviour is not necessarily a clear indicator of food stress. 
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food insecurity undoubtedly affected those households where some of the crop had either been 
eaten before the harvest, pledged to creditors or sold to pay debts incurred because of the 
inadequate harvests of 1994 and 1995. 
 
The erratic maize production recorded in Table 2 is explained almost entirely by rainfall variability, 
which “remains the largest single factor behind the variability of yields in most countries of the 
world” (Gommes and Petrassi 1994:5). The negative impacts on agriculture of repeated droughts in 
the 1990s have been cumulative in several respects. Secondary food crops such as cassava, sweet 
potato and sorghum are important alternatives to the staple, maize, but drought has affected even 
these more resistant crops, so the availability of sorghum seed and cassava and sweet potato 
cuttings - which are less widely marketed than maize seed - has also been adversely affected (Peters 
1995a:4). Many dimba gardens, which are a vital source of both food and income from marketed 
crops such as tomatoes and sugar cane, have dried up.12 Although the distribution of free hybrid 
seed boosts adoption in the short term - and hybrid maize is both higher yielding and earlier 
maturing than local varieties, making it a relatively good drought crop - cash constraints 
exacerbated by rapidly rising input prices mean that farmers are forced into ‘recycling’ hybrid seed, 
which leads to rapid reductions in yields (Peters 1995a:5). 
 
The effects of drought on agriculture can not be mitigated, except perhaps through large-scale 
irrigation. Smallholder irrigation schemes are presently under consideration, but are unlikely to 
have much impact for several years. Another option is to switch production towards more 
appropriate crops such as sorghum, millet and cassava. However, agricultural production in Malawi 
has become more concentrated than ever during the 1990s, due to the promotion of hybrid maize at 
the expense of alternative food crops, which despite being better suited to Malawi’s drier, drought-
prone areas have received virtually no credit, research or extension support from the Ministry of 
Agriculture.13 The objective of household food security strategies should be to increase the range of 
options available to poor people to access food. Any strategy which reduces choice also increases 
risk. Interventions such as the delivery of hybrid maize seeds plus fertiliser - whether for free 
(through Supplementary Inputs Projects), tied to loans (as in the collapsed Smallholder Agricultural 
Credit Programme), or in return for labour (‘inputs-for-work’), by definition increases the 
                                                          
12  Around 25% of Malawian households have dimba (wetland) gardens, where rice, sugarcane, cotton, 
cassava, beans, fruits and other vegetables are grown in addition to maize, contributing significantly to 
both household diets and income (MEPD et al. 1996:3). 
13  Production of secondary food crops (cassava, sweet potato) is mostly being promoted through seed 
multiplication projects by NGOs such as ActionAid-Malawi. 
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dependence of rural households on agriculturally-based livelihoods in general and on hybrid maize 
in particular, with all the obvious risks that this entails. 
 
• Self-sufficiency may be unsustainable in the long run 
Although Malawi has been self-sufficient in food production in most non-drought years since 
independence, inexorable population pressure and recurrent droughts may reverse this situation and 
leave Malawi as a chronically food deficit country dependent on imports in the not too distant 
future. Twice in the 1990s Malawi has been threatened with drought-induced famine, and the long 
term projections for per capita food production are pessimistic as land constraints intensify. 
 
Optimistic observers argue that Malawi could maintain self-sufficiency almost indefinitely if 
smallholders continue to shift away from local maize and towards hybrid varieties. Since hybrid 
yields are approximately three times those of local varieties, the population could theoretically 
treble before unbridgeable maize scarcities develop (House and Zimalirana 1992:151). But this 
requires a favourable policy environment - one which supports rather than undermines access to 
essential inputs by the poorest farmers - and a population growth which is neutral in terms of its 
impact on landholdings and cropping patterns. In Malawi, both assumptions are questionable. 
 
It is a commonly repeated truism that “Malawi is one of the most densely populated countries in 
Africa” (EIU 1996:10). Since independence in 1964, the population has risen from 4 million to 
10 million. At the current growth rate of 3.3% per annum - one of the highest in the world - the 
population will double again, to 20 million, in the next 20 years. Malawi experienced negative real 
growth in agriculture during the 1980s, as population growth exceeded the growth of agricultural 
GDP. By 1988, 56% of rural households farmed less than 1 hectare of land, and almost 80% farmed 
under 1.5 hectares (GoM 1995a:4). Population pressure is greatest in the Central and Southern 
regions, which already have average population densities of 260/km2. Fallowing and rotation of 
fields has disappeared in many places, cultivation has expanded into marginal, low-yielding land, 
and limited availability of grazing means that livestock herds - an important source of income and 
food security throughout rural Africa - are small. Only 37% of rural Malawian households own any 
livestock at all (MEPD et al. 1996:3). Consumption of animal protein in Malawi, at 6.3 kg per 
capita per annum, is half the average African’s annual consumption of 12.5 kg (GoM 1995b:16). 
 
Malawi’s rapid rural population growth is having adverse consequences on the environment as well 
as on household food security, and there are obvious interactions between the two. Agricultural 
liberalisation also has environmentally damaging side-effects. Tobacco curing, for instance, is 
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extremely wood-intensive, and the increased demand for fueldwood stimulated by the extension of 
burley tobacco production to the smallholder subsector is believed to be causing accelerated 
deforestation. In response to these environmental pressures, World Vision has implemented a land 
rehabilitation project in Chikwawa District, with support from WFP. The project aims “to enhance 
food security and arrest the degradation of land resources at the village level” (FSG 1994:15). 
Several other agencies, including CPAR, a Canadian NGO, are involved in soil and water 
conservation projects in rural areas. 
 
Related to these consequences of rapid rural population growth is the encroachment of estates onto 
customary land. The estate subsector in Malawi expanded dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1970 there were just 229 estates in Malawi. By 1979 this had risen to about 1,200 estates, 
covering about 300,000 hectares. In the 1980s, 13,000 new estates were established, covering more 
than 500,000 hectares. By 1990, when the transfer of land from customary tenure to leasehold was 
partially stopped by legislation, estates covered 843,000 hectares: 9% of Malawi’s total land area, 
but more than 25% in the relatively fertile Central Region. The supply of land available to 
smallholders nationwide fell from 8.2 million hectares in 1964 to 6.7 million hectares by 1994. 
 
Many new estates are small and were established by smallholders, to secure access to credit and to 
burley tobacco quotas. Registering leaseholds also provided security of tenure - registration was a 
defensive response to registration by other families in the area. The average estate size fell from 
345 ha in 1970 to 207 ha in 1979, to 53 ha in 1989. This suggests “a more varied continuum of 
agricultural enterprises” than simple “dualism” in Malawi (Mkandawire et al. 1990:x). These 
figures were recently updated by a series of reports which were produced out of Malawi’s 
ODA-sponsored ‘Estate Land Utilisation Study’ (ELUS) in early 1997.14 The study found that 
approximately one million of Malawi’s nine million hectares of land (11%) was registered to some 
28,000 estates. Of the remaining 7.6 million hectares, 1.6 million was public land and 7.4 million 
(82%) was under customary tenure (Gossage 1997:4). Although estates in Malawi were historically 
large - the average estate in Southern Region still exceeds 100 hectares - two-thirds of estates now 
fall in the 10-20 hectare range, following the recent rush to register customary land for leasehold by 
smallholder families or farmer groups. 
 
                                                          
14 Three related sets of studies were commissioned by Malawi’s Land Commission in 1996 - ELUS, 
CLUS, and PLUS - charged with examining land utilitisation in the estate sector, the customary sector 
and public lands sector respectively. By mid-1997, only ELUS had completed its work. 
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Estate lands are seriously underutilised. Mkandawire et al. (1990) found that cropping intensities 
averaged 23% on large estates (100+ ha), 38% on medium-sized estates (30-100 ha), and 50% on 
small estates (< 30 ha). On the smaller estates, food crops (hybrid maize, groundnuts, beans, fruit 
and vegetables) covered as much land in 1990 as tobacco, and were cultivated both to feed the 
workers and for sale. The recent ELUS study found an inverse relationship between crop rotation 
intensity - a measure of land utilisation - and estate size, suggesting that small estates make more 
intensive use of land than large estates, which also tend to have more underutilised land than small 
estates and the customary subsector. Almost half of estate land in the north, and one third in the 
south, was classified as underutilised (Gossage 1997). 
 
Steele (1997) found a ‘U-shaped’ relationship between estate size and various measures of 
productivity and profitability, with small estates (under 40 hectares) and large estates (over 
500 hectares) performing markedly better than intermediate estates (40-100 and 100-500 hectares). 
The explanation reflects the growing differentiation within the estate sector observed during the 
1980s and 1990s. Smallholder estates apply family labour intensively while the large colonial 
tobacco, tea and sugar plantations are both capital- and labour-intensive, but both these categories 
maximise productivity within their respective resource constraints, because they depend on the 
estate as their dominant or primary economic activity. By contrast, the majority of intermediate 
estates have been established by non-resident owners (mainly politicians and civil servants), who 
hire estate managers and supervisors but see the estate only as a secondary source of income, so 
that maximisation of output or profitability is not an overriding consideration. The implications of 
this finding are not drawn by Steele, but are politically controversial: smallholder estates should 
logically be promoted as a vehicle for poverty reduction, and large estates should be protected 
because they generate vital foreign exchange through tobacco, tea and sugar exports. It is the 
intermediate estates which contribute least to either the economic or equity objectives of Malawi’s 
agricultural policy, so if redistribution of land is to be adopted as a response to a perceived ‘land 
hunger’ among smallholders, it is the intermediate estates which should be targeted first. 
 
Excluded households are fighting back - there is evidence of encroachment onto estates by 
smallholders desperate for farming land. “The common incidence of encroachment is a reflection of 
the growing scarcity of land and other resources within the smallholder customary sector and is a 
manifestation of an apparent growth in tension in some areas between estates and surrounding 
communities” (Mkandawire et al. 1990:xiii). In the ELUS survey, as many as 18% of estates 
reported encroachment onto their land by outsiders, though only 3.3% of total estate area was 
estimated to be affected (Gossage 1997:19). Encroachment was most evident in the densely 
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populated Southern Region, where 26% of estates and 8% of land area was affected. Even though 
the spread of the estates has now been curbed, conflicts between smallholders and estate owners 
can be expected to increase in future. Women’s access to land, already limited to female-headed 
households (32%) in the customary sector, is far worse in the estate sector, where only 2.7% of 
registered owners are female (Bosworth 1996:3). 
 
Against this accumulation of evidence in support of the dominant discourse of malthusian crisis in 
rural Malawi, there are isolated hints that this alarmism might be exaggerated or premature. The 
ELUS study, for instance, found at least one significant fact which challenges the tendency to 
blame the estates for Malawi’s heavy pressure on land. Bosworth (1996:4) estimates that as much 
as 1.5 million hectares of customary plus estate land remains unutilised and available for 
cultivation, but of this only 300,000 hectares is on estates while 1.2 million hectares is in the 
customary sector. Unpublished fieldwork in a densely populated district around southern Lake 
Malawi found that smallholder patterns of land utilisation are patchy and highly localised. In one 
village there is virtually no uncultivated land left and natural boundaries constrain further 
agricultural extensification, but another village just 10-12 kilometers away is located in a lush 
forest area with unlimited potential for expansion in the medium term.15 
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, it remains uncontested that the main consequence of 
inexorable population growth and the expansion of the estates has been intensifying pressure on 
resources in Malawi’s smallholder areas. In the colonial period, before land shortages developed, 
the average rural household farmed 3-4 acres, under a system of shifting cultivation to maintain soil 
fertility (Berry and Petty 1992:70). But the average area of cultivated land per household has 
halved since the 1960s, from 1.5 hectares in 1968 to 0.75 hectares in 1994. Already, the poorest 
smallholders farming tiny plots of marginal land could not achieve household self-sufficiency even 
if they planted fertilised hybrid maize. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a rural class of ‘near-
landless’ people is emerging in densely populated rural areas. For all these households, additional 
cash income, plus reliable access to food through the market at reasonable prices, are essential for 
achieving food security. Other possible solutions to the land problem in Malawi include releasing 
more land to smallholders, and raising the productivity of smallholder cultivation. Specific policy 
options might include: 
 
                                                          
15 Personal communication, Paolo Craviolatti, University of Sussex, October 1996. 
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• Land redistribution: returning unutilised or under-utilised estate land to smallholders, or 
releasing some public land for smallholder cultivation. 
• Inducing or coercing estates to grow maize: ‘inducements’ through higher prices to make 
maize commercially attractive; ‘coercion’ through legislation forcing estate owners to plant a 
certain percentage (say, 25%) of their land to maize. 
• Improved agronomic practices: yields of hybrid maize average less than 3,000 kg/ha, well 
below the potential of 4,000 kg/ha. Agricultural extension officers should provide advice to 
smallholders in terms of farming practises that will improve yields. 
 
However successful technological interventions may be in the short term, the limits to food 
production in Malawi will eventually be reached, so all these efforts to release more land and to 
achieve greater productivity can only delay the inevitable. At some point - sooner rather than later - 
a structural transformation of the economy which enables many more people to earn their living 
outside agriculture is essential, if sustainable livelihoods are to be guaranteed to future generations. 
 
3. AGRICULTURAL LIBERALISATION 
The debate over the role of the state in agricultural marketing in Africa has evolved since the early 
days of structural adjustment - when the argument polarised around a dichotomous ‘state versus 
market’ choice between parastatals and private traders - towards the current broad consensus that 
the issue is no longer which alternative to adopt, but how to negotiate an appropriate role for each 
set of institutions in such a way that economic efficiency is maximised without prejudicing equity 
and welfare objectives. It is now widely accepted that parastatals generally cannot operate in an 
economically efficient manner, while the free market cannot guarantee food security for all citizens 
in contexts where infrastructure is weak and agricultural production is prone to fluctuations due to 
drought, conflict and other shocks. Accordingly, a compromise position is being negotiated in 
many countries, including Malawi, whereby the commercial functions of parastatal marketing 
agencies are being handed over to the private sector, but the parastatal retains vital national and 
household food security functions, such as managing a strategic grain reserve and defending floor 
prices for producers and ceiling prices for consumers, through limited interventions in the market 
that do not undermine the activities of private traders. 
 
Instead of rehearsing in detail the long and well-reported history of agricultural policy and 
structural adjustment programmes in Malawi, the following selectively summarises key elements in 
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terms of their food security implications for both the national economy and poor or vulnerable 
households. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Government of Malawi’s economic strategy centred on raising 
export crop revenues, especially tobacco from the estate subsector. To support this strategy, 
smallholders were required to provide maize, to feed Malawi’s population, and labour, to work on 
the estates. The parastatal ADMARC (the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation) 
extracted large surpluses from the smallholder subsector in this period, by paying smallholders well 
below export parity prices for their tobacco, cotton and groundnuts. Much of this surplus was 
invested in the estates (Harrigan 1991:205). State control over agriculture was reinforced by 
legislation which, inter alia, barred smallholders from growing burley and flue-cured tobacco 
varieties, and banned Asian traders from operating in rural areas. These policies undermined 
smallholder agriculture to such an extent that, by the early 1980s, they had become self-defeating 
and dysfunctional. “The decline of the smallholder sector was such that ADMARC could no longer 
extract a surplus, land and cheap labour could not be continually annexed and food self-sufficiency, 
either nationally (marketed) or individually (subsistence) could no longer be achieved” (Harrigan 
1991:216). 
 
Three structural adjustment loans were made to Malawi during the 1980s, the first as early as 1981. 
These were accompanied by a raft of agricultural reforms, essentially designed by the World Bank, 
most of which have now been partially or fully implemented. However, Malawi’s experience of 
structural adjustment during the 1980s was disappointing, in agriculture and in most other sectors. 
This poor performance was attributed by some observers - not least the World Bank - to slow and 
reluctant implementation. Largely because of the central economic and strategic functions of 
agriculture in the national political economy, the Government of Malawi has been reluctant to cede 
control of agriculture to the private sector - even today, agriculture still remains partly in the hands 
of the state - and it delayed key components of the liberalisation programme for as long as it 
could.16 For example, in 1983 it undertook to abolish fertiliser subsidies by 1988, under the second 
structural adjustment loan (SAL II), but as fertiliser import prices continued to rise - sharply after 
transport routes through Mozambique were closed in 1987 - the Government, fearing the impact on 
                                                          
16 Malawi’s cautiousness contrasts sharply with neighbouring Zambia, which is more urbanised (42% 
versus 11% in 1991) and less dependent on agriculture for employment and export earnings, and where 
a radical programme of agricultural liberalisation was implemented extremely rapidly in 1993/94. A 
contrast of Malawi’s cautious phasing with Zambia’s ‘short, sharp shock’ approach would make an 
illuminating case study. 
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maize production, reneged on this commitment and did not complete the Fertiliser Subsidy 
Removal Programme until 1995 (N’gon’gola 1996:14). 
 
This example reflects a broader struggle over policy direction, regarding both means and ends, 
between the Government of Malawi and the major donors, with the Government prioritising the 
objective of food self-sufficiency and the World Bank promoting increases in agricultural export 
revenue, in a context of steadily declining government capacity to provide material support to 
farmers (Harrigan 1991:202). The discussion below attempts to assess whether the livelihood crisis 
facing Malawian smallholders in the late 1990s is due to deficiencies in the remedies proposed 
under agricultural liberalisation (failures of analysis) or to problems in implementation (failures of 
policy). As always in such matters, the counterfactual question is intractable, so the discussion is 
necessarily limited to actual policy outcomes. 
 
3.1. The Case For Market Liberalisation in Malawi 
A recent USAID document (Brown, Reutlinger and Thomson, 1996) provides the clearest 
exposition yet of ‘A Market Oriented Approach’ to food security in Malawi, which is contrasted 
with a “traditional ‘food gap’ analysis”. In their introduction the authors assert that “there is a 
general acceptance of a market-oriented approach to development”, and the case for free markets is 
presented in strongly ideological terms. Markets are said to be “the most efficient way of allocating 
resources”; market oriented economies have had “the strongest economic growth” and have 
provided “the greatest well being to their people”; and “markets are the economic equivalent to 
liberal political democracy, a force that is also gaining widespread acceptance”. 
 
The ‘market-oriented approach’ sees the causes of food insecurity in Malawi in terms of excessive 
state intervention in the agricultural sector in the past, especially controls on production and trade, 
distortions in input and output markets, and consequent dampening effects on producer incentives. 
Market liberalisation in Malawi’s agricultural sector has meant the removal of subsidies for inputs 
such as fertilisers and seeds, a reduced role for ADMARC in the marketing of agricultural produce 
and the promotion of private traders (who have been permitted to buy and sell most crops since 
1987), the removal of constraints or restrictions on farmers’ cropping decisions (smallholders are 
now permitted to grow burley tobacco in open competititon with estates), and the privatisation of 
agricultural credit for smallholders (government-run SACA has become MRFC, a private 
company). Price controls have been removed for all crops except maize, where a price banding 
system is in operation. The Strategic Grain Reserve remains in place, at least for the present. 
 
Household Food Security in Malawi 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
16 
Advocates of agricultural liberalisation in Malawi argue that smallholders were hindered more than 
they were helped by previous interventionist policies, even when those interventions were intended 
to enhance household food security. They argue that the official promotion of hybrid maize resulted 
in a dangerous dependence on maize and reduced crop diversity. Restrictions on smallholders 
growing tobacco may have ensured more maize production and contributed to national food 
security, but only at the expense of reducing agricultural incomes and threatening household food 
security in cases where the farmer was a deficit maize producer. 
 
Accordingly, a general shift in support of crop diversification has become a key feature of 
agriculture sector policy in the 1990s. Crop diversification in Malawi has two distinct meanings: 
the promotion of a wider range of food crops, to reduce household dependence on drought-prone 
maize; and the promotion of export crops, to generate income for food purchases. While both are 
encouraged, the second is being more vigorously pursued as a means of achieving sustainable 
household food security, the argument being that using cash income to purchase food can be just as 
viable a strategy for poor smallholders as raising food production directly, and that improved 
incentives to farmers will promote employment as well as incomes: “agricultural intensification and 
diversification within the smallholder subsector are critical in increasing employment and income-
generating opportunities” (World Bank 1995:15). 
 
The World Bank and USAID believe that smallholders will respond to price incentives by 
specialising in high-value crops such as tobacco or cotton. Incomes will be higher in rural areas 
than before, and this in itself will stimulate trade and generate ‘multiplier effects’ in the form of 
increased demand for commodities (including food), labour and other services. This income will 
‘trickle down’ in the form of transfers to poorer relatives, so that even those who do not participate 
directly in the liberalised rural economy will ultimately also benefit. The World Bank has put 
substantial sums of money behind this argument, funding the Agricultural Sector Adjustment 
Programme (ASAP) since 1990, and contributing $45.8m to an agricultural services project in 1993 
(EIU 1996:19), which itself may partly explain this historic U-turn in government policy. 
 
It is certainly the case that one of the most significant developments in smallholder agriculture 
during the 1990s has been their adoption of burley tobacco. In 1990, legislation preventing 
smallholders producing burley tobacco, which had been introduced in 1972 to protect the 
commercial estates and encourage smallholders to concentrate on maize, was repealed. The supply 
response was immediate and dramatic. Malawi’s production of burley tobacco “has trebled over the 
past decade” (EIU 1996:20), this acceleration coming mainly from the smallholder subsector. These 
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shifts in cropping patterns can be seen as the product of two severe drought years in quick 
succession (1992 and 1994), a reorientation of state policy towards crop diversification and away 
from explicit support to maize production (especially the ending of smallholder’s preferential 
access to credit in 1994 and the removal of fertiliser subsidies in 1995), and the generally 
liberalised agricultural environment (which included the ending of ADMARC’s monopoly on 
agricultural marketing as well as the lifting of restrictions on smallholder production choices). 
 
A recent World Bank study (1995:6) claims that structural adjustment in Malawi has produced a 
positive “overall supply response” in agriculture, by the following mechanisms: 
 
• “exchange rate realignments have maintained the profitability of agricultural exports” 
• a significant supply response to price incentives, as demonstrated by smallholders entering 
into burley tobacco production 
• the “removal of import restrictions [caused] a substantial increase in the use of fertiliser in the 
agricultural sector despite the increase in their price relative to produce” 
• “the rationalisation of input prices, such as reduced subsidies to fertilisers, that occurred 
under these policy reforms should have increased the efficiency in the utilisation of inputs 
even while raising the costs of production” [emphases added]. 
 
3.2. The Case Against Market Liberalisation in Malawi 
Three arguments can be levelled against the liberalisation of agriculture in Malawi, particularly in 
terms of the manner and pace of its implementation. Again, these critiques can be expressed in the 
form of propositions: first, that the private sector is weak and undeveloped, so the removal of the 
parastatal from agricultural marketing will lead to exploitation or neglect of smallholders; second, 
that rising input and output prices have accelerated processes of rural stratification; and third, that 
price variability for agricultural produce (both food and export crops) threatens household food 
security. 
 
• The private sector is weak and undeveloped, and will exploit or neglect smallholders 
Three justifications have been advanced for state intervention in agricultural marketing: to 
compensate for market failure, to promote market development and to support income distribution 
objectives (Smith 1995:562). Parastatal marketing agencies are supposed to ensure that all 
smallholders enjoy access to markets and are offered fair prices for their produce. In Malawi, 
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ADMARC set up marketing depots in even the remotest communities, and pan-territorial and 
pan-seasonal pricing were introduced. These policies compensated for market failures and achieved 
income distribution and national food security objectives for several years and to varying degrees, 
but at the cost of severe economic inefficiencies and the virtual elimination of private traders from 
the agricultural sector. Nonetheless, the case for closing down ADMARC and supporting the 
re-emerging private sector in agricultural marketing is far from straightforward. 
 
Since the late 1980s, ADMARC has been restructured along commercial lines, and its dominance in 
agricultural marketing has been steadily declining. Nonetheless, its role in the process of 
agricultural liberalisation remains both powerful and unresolved. The government and several 
donors and NGOs argue that ADMARC must continue to play a ‘safety net’ role as buyer and seller 
of last resort, at least until private traders are ready to take over these functions. This argument 
reflects a broader concern that the pace of reform is too fast and that the private sector is not 
sufficiently developed for full market liberalisation. USAID, on the other hand, believes that the 
development of private trade is constrained by the presence of ADMARC in the market, so that its 
abolition or privatisation is an urgent priority. USAID argues that ADMARC has little impact on 
the rural poor anyway, because of their low cash incomes and limited participation in the market - 
though this assertion is contested. A recent USAID report concludes that “maintenance of the 
current ADMARC structure is a very costly way to implement a safety net programme, and is likely 
to have little direct effect on the very poorest” (Brown et al. 1996:77). 
 
The pressures on ADMARC to cover its operating costs (to be self-financing) while at the same 
time to retain its food security mandate have produced predictable contradictions between its 
commercial and its ‘developmental’ functions (World Bank 1995:69). Several unprofitable depots 
have been closed, for instance, because they are too costly to maintain (a process which might be 
described as ‘adverse de-selection’), yet these depots are located in precisely those remote 
communities which are vulnerable to either neglect or exploitation by private traders - and which 
ADMARC should surely, therefore, continue to serve. “As part of the restructuring of ADMARC, 
several of its centers were closed but traders failed to move into these areas, leaving large gaps in 
the trading network. ....in no rural areas are there sufficient traders storing maize in the deficit 
season to replace ADMARC as guarantor of rural food supplies” (Peters 1996c:21 and 1995b:5). 
Attempts to facilitate the entry of private traders to markets which ADMARC itself has abandoned 
as uneconomic have, predictably, failed. “ADMARC attempted to implement a commission agent 
system for markets that are not financially viable, but despite attractive offers to sell or rent 
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warehouses, they found little interest among private traders, and the program was discontinued” 
(N’gon’gola 1996:18). 
 
The sluggish response of the private sector to the liberalising environment in Malawi can be 
attributed to rural poverty, capital constraints and political uncertainty. Shortage of capital is 
perhaps the main barrier confronting private traders entering the market as ADMARC slowly 
withdraws. Traders need start-up capital to invest in transport and storage facilities, as well as 
working capital for purchasing crops, paying employees and costs of fuel for moving crops from 
farmgate to markets. Also, in contrast to a nationwide marketing agency with government support 
behind it, individual traders enjoy neither the economies of scale nor the ability to cross-subsidise 
loss-making outlets, crops or years with profits derived elsewhere. Besides, the capacity to invest 
must be accompanied by a willingness to do so. Before traders are willing to invest heavily in 
vehicles and warehouses they must be confident that the policy environment in which they are 
operating is conducive and will remain favourable to their enterprise. During the early 1990s the 
policy environment and the political situation in Malawi were turbulent and unpredictable, which 
compounded the reluctance of traders to invest heavily in agricultural marketing, even if they could 
find the means to do so.  
 
More recently, ADMARC’s continuing attempts at counter-seasonal price stabilisation through 
manipulating the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) have either discouraged traders from entering the 
market, or encouraged them to take advantage of the market distortions which result. The SGR is 
not simply an emergency stock of grain held against drought-induced food supply shocks, but has 
an active price stabilising role. ADMARC has been contracted to manage the SGR cost-effectively, 
but with explicit household food security objectives: to boost smallholder incomes by supporting 
producer prices for marketed maize (the floor price), and to promote maize consumption in poor 
households by holding consumer prices down (the ceiling price). The ‘price band’ was set at 
K1.25-K2.50 in the 1994/95 season, and K1.53-K2.50 in the 1995/96 season. But its effectiveness 
as a food security intervention is undermined by traders who purchase maize very early, at well 
below the floor price - when poor smallholders are desperate to sell at any price - and sell it back to 
ADMARC or to consumers at inflated scarcity prices later in the year (GoM 1995b:12). 
 
A 1995 survey of grain traders in southern Malawi highlighted the dangers to household food 
security of ADMARC’s partial withdrawal from the market, but was also sympathetic to the real 
difficulties faced by traders. At times of year and in those rural areas where ADMARC is no longer 
operational, private traders are price setters, and the survey found that they typically undercut the 
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official floor price for purchasing maize from producers by up to 30%. Conversely, traders sell 
maize back to consumers in the deficit season at prices which are 10%-50% higher than ADMARC 
ceiling prices (Peters 1995b:2). In other words, the spread of prices offered by private traders is 
much wider than the floor/ceiling ‘price band’ adopted by ADMARC, which is to the advantage of 
traders but to the detriment of both producers and consumers. For their part, traders complain of 
lack of working capital (either cash or credit), and related shortages of storage facilities and 
transport. They also feel constrained by ADMARC’s continuing presence in the market, which 
inhibits their ability to expand the scale of their operations, and by the price banding system, which 
offers them an “insufficient profit margin between prevailing buying and selling prices of maize” 
(Peters 1995b:2). 
 
These last two points might seem to provide support for the ‘American’ view that market 
liberalisation should be rapid, complete and unambiguous, if the private sector is to step into the 
breach left by the grain parastatal when it withdraws. I would argue instead that the current 
confusion in agricultural marketing in Malawi has been caused by a failure to separate adequately 
the two objectives of promoting market efficiency through commercialisation, while simultaneously 
protecting household food security. The first objective can be left to the private sector while the 
second should be assigned to ADMARC, at least until the private sector demonstrates that it is 
sufficiently developed and competitive to address both sets of needs with only minimal regulation. 
If this demarcation of responsibilities had been clearly drawn and communicated to all stakeholders 
at the start of the liberalisation process, the roles and activities of ADMARC and the private sector 
would now be complementary to each other, instead of which they are competing for the same 
territory in a manner which is damaging to them both - and to their clients, the food producers and 
consumers of Malawi. 
 
Of course it is a moot point whether the private sector could ever fill the gap left by ADMARC 
without a major accompanying structural transformation of Malawi’s rural economy. One of the 
major failings of market liberalisation in much of Africa has been its naïve assumption that active 
suppression in the past of the private sector by the state constitutes sufficient evidence of an 
inherently competitive and efficient free market economy waiting to be unleashed once the 
‘bureaucratic leviathan’ of the public sector is removed. In reality, rural economies in Africa are 
characterised by extreme poverty, exacerbated by agricultural seasonality and inaccessibility, 
leading to high transactions costs for both private economic activities and the delivery of public 
services. In such unfavourable circumstances, the most likely outcome from market liberalisation is 
not perfect competititon, but neglect of poor and vulnerable areas by traders who see no profit to be 
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made, or exploitation by a few monopolistic or cartelised opportunists. Malawi’s experience 
appears to confirm the concern of structural adjustment’s critics that the naïve liberalisation model 
simply ignores the asymmetric capacities and objectives of the private and public sectors.17 
 
• Rising input and output prices have accelerated processes of rural stratification 
Who are the winners and losers from the positive “overall supply response” in Malawian 
agriculture? Which farmers are best placed to take advantage of the increased profitability of export 
crops? Which farmers are using more fertiliser than before, and which have been excluded from 
productivity-enhancing inputs by the phasing out of subsidies? 
 
Agricultural liberalisation means higher prices for both inputs and outputs, with ambiguous 
consequences for farmers. The complete removal of the government’s fertiliser subsidy by 1995 
(under the FSRP), together with the devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha (which was floated in 
October 1994) and the subsequent inflation caused fertiliser prices to sky-rocket. The nominal price 
of a 50kg bag of urea more than quadrupled in two years, from K64 in 1993/94 to K296 in 1995/96 
(Pearce et al. 1996:5). Fertiliser use, already heavily skewed towards the larger smallholder farmers 
and the estates, has become more so as input prices rise. These stratifying effects of agricultural 
liberalisation are recognised and acknowledged even by its strongest proponents: “only the 35% of 
wealthiest smallholders have benefited from increased supplies of credit, fertiliser and hybrid maize 
seed” (World Bank 1995:42). USAID concedes that: “Overall, families who have access to 
purchased inputs, and hence can plant tobacco and hybrid maize have done well out of 
liberalisation. .... Households which are maize deficit, and have no resources to invest in improved 
maize varieties have lost out. .... they are fated to a life of increased marginalisation” (Brown et al. 
1996:67). 
 
According to the Ministry of Agriculture’s 1988 survey of agriculture, only 15% of smallholders in 
Malawi farmed enough land to produce a surplus, a further 22% had enough land to produce only 
for their own food requirements, while the remaining 63% were food deficit households. The 
World Bank (1995:14) argues that households which produce surpluses “could produce larger and 
more diversified surpluses and become prosperous small commercial farmers, if appropriate 
                                                          
17  In fact, comparative evidence from several African countries reveals a spectrum of relative success or 
failure, depending to specific contexts and circumstances. “Market liberalisation in some instances 
(Tanzania and Zimbabwe) has enhanced movement of grain and therefore food security. In other cases 
(Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia), the collapse of, or deregulation of grain parastatals 
has left a vacuum which the private sector cannot fill easily given the unattractiveness of undertaking 
grain trade in remote areas with a poor infrastructure” (Rukuni and Anandajayasekeram 1996:9). 
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policies and supporting actions were implemented”. Indeed, it is clear that this group are the main 
beneficiaries of market liberalisation policies. Surplus farmers should gain on balance from the rise 
in input and output prices, since they will recover their higher investment in inputs from higher 
prices for surpluses sold. However, this is dependent on favourable weather and markets. In bad 
rainfall years, farmers might not produce marketable surpluses and so might not recover their 
investment. It follows that, as a general rule, only wealthier farmers and those with diversified 
income sources would be willing and able to take this risk. In good years, or when many farmers 
have switched to a lucrative crop because of good prices earned the previous year, the market for 
that crop will be flooded and prices could collapse - as seems to have happened to tobacco, cotton 
and soybean in Malawi in 1996 (see below). 
 
Broadly speaking, households cultivating larger plots (>0.5 hectare) have gained through increased 
maize yields, using hybrid seed and fertilisers, and diversification into lucrative tobacco production. 
However, households cultivating small plots (<0.5 hectare) have generally not increased either 
production or yields, since they face restricted access to inputs and have little or no land available 
for crop diversification. Zeller et al. (1996) found that tobacco-growing households held more land 
per capita (0.52 ha) than local maize growers (0.38 ha). Landholding being an accepted proxy for 
poverty in rural Malawi,18 the authors conclude that larger landholdings are associated with higher 
risk-bearing capacity. They also argue that the major constraint to tobacco and hybrid maize 
adoption is not access to land but access to capital, and they conclude that the best mechanism for 
promoting crop diversification among smallholders is improved access to credit (Zeller et al. 
1996:182). 
 
From this evidence it seems reasonable to conclude that the liberalisation of tobacco production is 
not the solution to poverty and food insecurity in rural Malawi. Larger farmers are benefiting 
disproportionately - they cultivate more tobacco and are more likely to join ‘burley clubs’ to gain 
access to tobacco auctions where they can earn world market prices (Peters 1996c:12). Conversely, 
smaller farmers tend to produce tiny quantities of burley for sale to local traders at lower prices. As 
a consequence economic stratification within rural communities is almost certainly accelerating. 
It might even be hypothesised that the current policy of promoting crop diversification could be 
detrimental to food security in the poorest households, because it encourages them to invest in more 
expensive agricultural technologies and to adopt potentially riskier cropping patterns for uncertain 
rewards. Although monocropping is a risky strategy, diversification within agriculture has its own 
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dangers. Adding market dependence to climatic vulnerability need not increase household food 
insecurity, but it can do if yields or prices are more variable for marketed crops. 
 
Another reservation is that tobacco production is dominated by men, so that the implications of 
higher household incomes on intra-household consumption and food security are unclear. If the 
incremental income earned from tobacco is largely diverted to non-food expenditures, or if school 
attendance is adversely affected by children having to work the tobacco plots, then a paradoxical 
situation could arise whereby increased income at the household level translates into no gains or 
even negative consequences for the majority of household members. 
 
Possibly the only empirical evidence available to date on the distribution of gains and losses from 
market liberalisation in rural Malawi is provided by Peters’ longitudinal study of 200 households in 
the Shire highlands. In a comparison of inflation-adjusted real incomes ‘before’ (1987) and ‘after’ 
(1991) agricultural liberalisation in Malawi, Peters (1996c:39) found that an aggregate increase in 
per capita incomes of 26% for the sample as a whole disguised major gains for the top income 
quartile of households (+56%), but significant losses for the bottom (-16%) and second to bottom (-
10%) quartiles. Although based on one small sample, this evidence directly contradicts the view 
taken by apologists for market liberalisation - that liberalisation in Africa has left the rural poor no 
worse off, and in most cases better off, than before.19 
 
• Price variability for agricultural produce threatens household food security 
The Government of Malawi’s commitment to market liberalisation is tempered by a concern that 
the food security status of its vulnerable citizens will not be guaranteed - and may well be 
undermined - by the unleashing of market forces in the agricultural sector. For this reason, the 
Government has insisted on maintaining some control over maize prices (‘price banding’ for 
producer and consumer prices), and the Strategic Grain Reserve remains. Under free market 
conditions farmers inevitably face variable and unpredictable prices for the crops they grow for 
sale, and consumers - including deficit food producers - are exposed to seasonal price rises for basic 
food commodities. Despite ADMARC’s control over grain marketing in Malawi, significant price 
seasonality was evident during the 1991/92 drought. Monitoring of 24 village markets found that 
maize prices quadrupled in just three months - July to September - after the failed 1992 harvest, 
from 62 tambala to 245 tambala per kilogram (UNICEF-Malawi 1992:7). 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 ‘Landholding’ is defined either in terms of ownership (where the household possesses a legal title to 
the land) or in terms of usufruct rights (which are issued under customary law). 
19 See, for example, the selection of country case studies presented in Sahn, 1996. 
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A key feature of grain market liberalisation in Malawi has been a general increase in maize prices, 
with ambivalent effects on the food security status of smallholders, particularly the majority who 
are both producers and purchasers of food. Rising prices have eroded the purchasing power of net 
purchasers of maize. As Peters (1995b:2) points out, higher purchase prices by ADMARC and 
private traders at harvest time also means higher prices for purchases by deficit households later in 
the year, because price seasonality has not been smoothed. Recognising this fact, Peters argues, 
farmers are more reluctant than ever to sell maize after harvest, despite the higher prices now being 
offered. An equally plausible scenario, however, is that ‘distress sales’ of maize to meet pressing 
cash needs are continuing among the poorest smallholders, but that higher buy-back prices some 
months later (when their granaries are depleted) leaves them less able to feed their households 
adequately than before. Peters herself finds evidence of a ‘U-curve’ in terms of the proportion of 
households selling maize by income decile, suggesting that “the very poorest sell more food than 
they would like because they have few other options to earn cash” (Peters 1996b:2). They 
participate in the market on more unfavourable terms than wealthier households, being forced to 
sell when prices are lowest and buy when prices are highest, usually in small quantities which cost 
more than bulk purchases. Female-headed households are particularly severely affected, since they 
have less labour available for off-farm income earning activities. 
 
The situation for export crops is even more uncertain. Changing relative prices have favoured food 
crops one year and export crops the next, and led to substantial swings in smallholder cropping 
patterns, both between food and export crops and between different export crops. “In the context of 
land and technology constraints and monopoly markets this has, in turn, led to substitutions 
between crops, rather than an aggregate increase in supply and/or incomes” (World Bank 1995:66). 
 
Cropping decisions depend on the relative returns to different crops, which in turn depend on the 
costs of their respective inputs, the price paid to producers for the crops, and the cost of buying 
food instead of growing it. A survey during 1995 compared local maize, hybrid maize and tobacco 
production by 404 smallholder households in five districts of Malawi (Zeller et al. 1996). This 
study found that local maize was grown by the majority of households, despite offering lower 
yields and returns than either hybrid maize or tobacco. The authors speculate that the reasons for 
many farmers persisting with local maize include the higher capital intensity and labour 
requirements of hybrid maize and (especially) tobacco. The direct costs of producing these crops 
are higher because of the investment they require in terms of labour time, fertilisers, facilities to 
bale and cure tobacco, and so on. But another factor is the variation in yields and returns across 
Household Food Security in Malawi 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
25 
different crops. Local maize yields lower but more stable returns than hybrid maize or tobacco. 
Poorer households have a lower capacity to bear risk, so in their food security strategies they tend 
to prefer low return, low-risk crops to higher-yielding crops which might be prone to instability in 
either yield or prices.20 Since gross returns are a multiple of output and selling price, income 
instability can be caused by variability of either factor - and even an increase in production can 
have detrimental consequences. 
 
As smallholders in Malawi turn increasingly to export crops like burley tobacco, cotton, soya and 
sunflower, “the market prices for these commodities has crashed as more people produce the 
commodities for cash. The cash which the smallholder was depending on is now not available, and 
the result is greater food insecurity, not less” (Henry 1996:4). In 1996, for instance, Malawi’s 
smallholder cotton farmers were devastated when ADMARC offered to buy their crop at K4.50 per 
kilogram, having announced earlier in the season that it would pay K7.70. In response ADMARC 
blamed “prevailing market forces” - the collapse of Malawi’s textile industry and falling 
international cotton prices.21 
 
Following the excellent auction prices paid for burley tobacco in 1995, Peters (1995b:4) astutely 
predicted that: “So many smallholder farmers were impressed with the burley prices received that it 
is very likely that there will be a considerable increase in numbers growing next season..... the 
amount of tobacco for sale might attract the new buyers to return or, alternatively, so many will be 
trying to sell that the price offered will fall.” In the event, a combination of over-supply of burley 
on the market and poor quality of produce - due to pests, disease outbreaks and heavy rains which 
resulted in mouldy leaves - led to low prices being offered on auction floors and by traders in 1996. 
“Tobacco sales at Limbe Auction Floors came to a halt yesterday morning when farmers cried foul 
at the “low prices” offered at the floors. Management of the Auction Floors says the prices are low 
because the tobacco is poor quality. Yatima, a tobacco farmer in Mangochi, lamented that the price 
was so low it could not offset the high cost of farm inputs and transport expenses to the Auction 
Floors.”22 The outlook for world market prices of tobacco is described as “unfavourable” by the 
World Bank (1995:9) for at least the next few years, which would negate the economic value of any 
overall supply increase and threatens to undermine, not enhance, smallholder incomes. 
                                                          
20 This was the basis of the argument against cash cropping in the 1970s, which asserted that food 
insecurity increases the more markets a household has to go through to acquire food. Food production 
is subject only to climatic uncertainty, but cash crops are subject to both climatic and market 
uncertainties. 
21 ‘Cotton farmers embittered over prices’ (Malawi News, Lilongwe, 8-14 June 1996:1). 
22 ‘Price uproar hits tobacco: Farmers protest “no returns”’ (The Nation, Lilongwe, 26 April 1996:1). 
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More generally, Malawi’s complex experience of agricultural liberalisation has highlighted some 
fundamental concerns about both the substance and process of reform during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Despite producing many positive impacts, the policies promoted by the World Bank and 
implemented by government (with varying degrees of enthusiasm or reluctance) have often proved 
to be internally contradictory and in conflict with their own objectives. For example, the Bank’s 
insistence on the removal of input subsidies contradicted its support for smallholder adoption of 
fertiliser-responsive hybrid maize varieties. Related to this, the Bank also aimed to promote 
smallholder production of high-value export crops through raising farmgate prices towards export 
parity (which was virtually achieved by 1988), which again clashed with its enthusiasm for hybrid 
maize and with the government’s national food self-sufficiency goals (Harrigan 1991:223). 
 
Crucially, the Bank failed even to recognise the potential conflict between food crop and export 
crop production by smallholders, instead advocating policies that were intended to promote both 
objectives simultaneously (Kydd and Hewitt 1986:357). Malawi’s smallholders have a reputation 
for being highly responsive to price incentives, but the Bank’s belief that pricing policy reform in 
itself would produce an aggregate increase in smallholder production was misguided. The 
constraints facing smallholders (notably land scarcity) were already becoming so severe by the 
1980s that changes in relative prices simply encouraged smallholders to switch out of maize 
production to grow export crops instead, with negative consequences for food production and 
ambiguous consequences for national and household food security.23 For the poorest smallholders, 
though, the overall impact of these market liberalisation measures was certainly negative, because 
of “a tendency on the part of the Bank to regard input and output price instruments as symmetrical 
in impact with the belief that higher producer prices would compensate for higher input prices. 
Although such symmetry applied to those farmers able to produce for the market, subsistence 
producers derived no benefit from higher producer prices yet faced increasing input prices” 
(Harrigan 1991:228). 
 
The irreconcilability of these two strategies, especially in a context of dwindling landholdings per 
household, is apparently not recognised even today, judging by recent World Bank and USAID 
documents on agriculture in Malawi. Diversification within the smallholder subsector remains the 
                                                          
23 For instance, “sharp producer price increases in the early 1980s generated a large increase in marketed 
surplus, prompting a reversal of price policy. The extent to which farmers then switched out of maize 
was excessive and necessitated maize imports. Since 1988 the maize producer price has been increased 
dramatically. This led to a recovery in ADMARC purchases and a re-stocking of the country’s 
180,000-ton strategic grain reserve” (EIU 1996:19). 
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key strategic objective. Smallholders are expected to feed themselves and produce marketed 
surpluses for national food security by growing hybrid maize, and these same households are 
encouraged to generate cash income for themselves and foreign exchange revenue for Malawi by 
growing tobacco or cotton for cash - all this, presumably, on half a hectare of land per family of six. 
 
4. HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY 
Concern about rural poverty and household food insecurity in Malawi has risen during the 1990s, 
as social and economic indicators of wellbeing and development continue to deteriorate and no 
obvious solutions emerge. This section reviews some of these indicators and processes, before 
assessing a number of interventions that have been implemented or proposed to address the food 
security problems of Malawi’s rural poor. 
 
4.1. Characteristics of Household Food Insecurity in Malawi 
Malnutrition and child mortality rates in Malawi are among the worst in Africa and the highest in 
the world. Infant mortality stood at 150 per 1,000 live births in 1991, 56% of rural children were 
stunted in 1993, and one child in four dies before reaching the age of five (House and Zimalirana 
1992:145; Sahn and van Frausum 1994:413). Not all of this is directly attributed to household food 
insecurity - other determinants of poor nutrition and health outcomes include poor sanitation 
conditions and biases in intra-household food distribution and health-seeking behaviour - but a 
good deal of undernutrition and ill-health in Malawi can be explained by diets which are inadequate 
in terms of both quantity and quality (GoM 1995b). 
 
Underlying most of these tragic statistics is poverty. Approximately 30% of the rural population fell 
below the ‘calorie needs line’ in 1992 - their annual income (including the imputed value of food 
production) was insufficient to purchase 200 kg of maize - and 43% fell below the ‘basic needs 
line’ - they were unable to buy a minimum basket of goods such as adequate clothing (World Bank 
1996:24). An alternative recent estimate categorises 40-50% of Malawians as food insecure and 
asserts that over 60% have incomes below the poverty line (Zeller et al. 1996:169). 
 
At the individual or household level, food insecurity is the inability to acquire - through production, 
purchase plus transfers - sufficient food for a healthy, active life. Key determinants of household 
food insecurity in rural Malawi relate to constraints on household food production and the limited 
availability of off-farm income-earning opportunities. Put simply, the rural poor in Malawi are 
unable either to grow or to purchase enough food. Even though the livelihood portfolio of a 
Household Food Security in Malawi 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 
‘typical’ rural household is more diversified than was previously thought (as seen below), the 
combined food and income generated by these various economic activities falls consistently below 
minimum consumption requirements. 
 
The Government’s Food Security and Nutrition Policy Statement (1990) identified four categories 
of food insecure households in Malawi: 
 
• “Very Small Smallholders with less than 0.5 of a hectare” - for whom “targeted income 
transfers” would be needed to protect their food security in the short term; 
• “Medium Smallholders with between 0.5 - 1.0 of a hectare” - who have the potential to achieve 
self-sufficiency if their agricultural productivity is improved; 
• “Estate Wage Employees” and “Estate Tenants” - who suffer respectively from very low wages 
and unfavourable contractual arrangements with their employers; 
• “Low Income Urban Dwellers” - who constitute a small but growing category of poor and food 
insecure households in Malawi. 
 
This discussion focuses on the first two of these four categories. Currently, poverty in Malawi 
remains concentrated in smallholder agriculture, which employs eight times as many people as the 
estates - though there are strong linkages between the two sectors (many smallholders supplement 
their income by working on the estates, and the historic distinction between estate and smallholder 
agriculture is becoming increasingly “scrambled” (Peters 1996a:9), as discussed above). Urban 
poverty is minimal, comprising only 1% of the total poor, partly because of Malawi’s low rate of 
urbanisation - just 12%, but rising - and an unusually small informal sector (Sahn and van Frausum 
1994). Employment data for Malawi are scarce and dated. In 1983 only 14% of workers were 
formally employed, and although the formal sector created 10,000 jobs each year during the 1980s, 
almost 150,000 job-seekers entered the market each year during the 1990s. In 1992 it was estimated 
that one million Malawians were employed in informal sector businesses, though this does not 
include petty economic activities such as food processing, beer brewing and other minor income 
sources which contribute significantly to the meagre livelihoods of Malawi’s rural poor (Cammack 
1996:37). 
 
Due mainly to limited off-farm employment opportunities, poverty and area of land cultivated are 
closely correlated in Malawi. Three in four smallholder households (74%) who farm less than half 
a hectare of land fall below the 40th income percentile, as do 95% of households cultivating less 
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than one hectare. By contrast, only one household in five (21%) cultivating between half and one 
hectare, and one household in twenty (5%) farming more than one hectare subsist in poverty, by 
this criterion (World Bank 1996:37). Table 3 illustrates how the unequal distribution of land among 
Malawi’s smallholders translates directly into their relative ability to meet subsistence food 
requirements from own production. 
 
 Table 3.  Average Annual Maize Production by Landholding Category 
Farm size  
(hectares)  
Households  
(percent)24 
HH size 
(AEs) 
Maize    
required   
Maize    
production   
Percent of    
requirement  
Deficit or    
Surplus   
< 0.5     26%   3.9   836 kg        265 kg         32%   - 571 kg      
0.5 < 1.0     30%   4.4   946 kg        618 kg         65%   - 328 kg      
1.0 < 1.5     20%   4.8   1034 kg        1006 kg         97%   - 28 kg      
1.5 < 2.0     11%   5.2   1144 kg        934 kg         82%   - 210 kg      
> 2.0     13%   6.5   1430 kg        2247 kg         157%   +817 kg      
  Source:  IFAD 1993:50 
 
The data presented in Table 3 suggest that the concept of ‘subsistence farmers’ in Malawi is a 
non sequitur. Over 85% of smallholder households are deficit producers of maize (although IFAD 
have chosen a rather generous definition of ‘maize requirements’). Only one in five smallholders - 
those cultivating between 1.0 and 1.5 hectares - produce roughly what they need in an ‘average’ 
year. Those farming less than one hectare face severe and recurrent production deficits, while only 
those whose landholdings exceed two hectares are producing sizeable surpluses for sale.25 This 
evidence indicates that landholding is a fairly reliable proxy for poverty and food insecurity in 
Malawi, and could be used as a targeting criterion with relatively limited leakages to the non-poor. 
 
                                                          
24  Another source has the distribution of landholding more skewed to the left than IFAD data suggest: 
41% of smallholders farm less than 0.5 ha; 31% farm 0.5-1.0 ha; and 27% (instead of IFAD’s 44%) 
farm more than 1 ha (World Bank 1996:37). 
25  The category of households farming 1.5-2.0 hectares is a curious anomaly in an otherwise linear 
sequence. Perhaps this group, lacking land to produce marketable surpluses but enjoying access to 
lucrative formal or informal employment opportunities, chooses to invest more in off-farm economic 
activities than in agriculture - which is analogous to the ‘U-curve’ recorded above for productivity of 
estates. 
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The problematic relationship between landholding and household food security in Malawi can be 
clarified by considering the ‘malthusian equation’ of food production and land potential. One 
hectare planted to hybrid maize will yield 2,500 kg under fair conditions, or 1,500 kg ‘surplus’ after 
input costs (mainly fertiliser and seeds) are factored out. If nutritional needs average 200 kg per 
adult per year, this means that one hectare can feed 7.5 adult equivalents, so each adult equivalent 
needs 0.13 hectares of cultivable land. Yields of local maize varieties are much lower, though, at 
800-1,000 kg, so a typical half hectare plot can only produce enough food for 2.5 adult 
equivalents - but average family sizes are larger than this, while farm sizes for the poor are smaller. 
The mean farm size in 1993 was 0.8 ha per household, but just 0.4 ha for the poorest 20%. “Even 
under ideal conditions, the land that the smallholders in the lower three income deciles can cultivate 
is not sufficient to provide sufficient food for the household” (World Bank 1996:43). 
 
Limited access to land, restricted access to yield-enhancing inputs, and shortages of household 
labour, particularly in female-headed households, combine to ensure chronic production deficits 
and a lengthy annual ‘hungry season’ in poor households even in good rainfall years. A 1990 
survey of on-farm granary stocks found that 70-85% of smallholder households had completely 
depleted their granaries by December, leaving them market dependent for 4-5 months until the next 
harvest in April or May. In some districts, such as the Shire Valley in southern Malawi, the self-
sufficiency ratio is as low as 23% for the poorest 20% of smallholders, meaning that three-quarters 
of the food they need must be purchased. Most of these households are too poor to purchase 
sufficient food to maintain adequate nutrition levels. Off-farm employment makes up some of this 
deficit, but not all, and pre-harvest rationing of food consumption is common. Rural households 
eating one, two and three meals daily in the 1990 survey were 13%, 55% and 32% respectively 
(Johnson 1996:7).  
 
Naturally, these figures vary greatly from year to year and across districts, depending on harvests, 
so statements of the kind that “only one-third of the smallholder farmers are self-sufficient in 
maize” (Johnson 1996:8) are misleading generalisations. Peters’ longitudinal survey of over 100 
smallholder households in Zomba, southern Malawi, highlights the inter-annual variability in food 
security status (Table 4). By December 1995, over half the households surveyed (52%) had run out 
of food. In December 1997, by contrast, only one household in five (21%) was projected to be in 
this position. While 1997 is a year of good rainfall, the rainy season was disappointing in both 1995 
and 1996, and 1995 was also a recovery year following the 1994 drought. 
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 Table 4.  Zomba households running out of own maize 
    Month 1995 1996 1997 
 June    2 %   3 %    0 % 
 July    6 %   6 %    0 % 
 August    9 % 10 %    0 % 
 September  14 % 15 %    0 % 
 October  23 % 20 %    8 % 
 November  36 % 28 %  14 % 
 December  52 % 39 %  21 % 
 January  69 % 49 %  34 % 
 February  85 % 67 %  40 % 
 March  90 % 76 %  54 % 
 April  95 % 96 %  57 % 
 May 100 % 99 % 100 % 
    Source:  Peters (1996a:8).  Figures for 1997 are projections. 
 
The distribution of poverty and food insecurity in Malawi is geographically concentrated. The 
Southern Region occupies one-third of Malawi’s total land area, but contains half the population 
and is home to two-thirds of the country’s poor. Once again, access to land emerges as a critical 
factor. Farm sizes average 1.4 ha in Central Region but only 0.9 ha in the south. Malthusian logic 
predicts that this situation can only deteriorate in years to come. Population densities in terms of 
arable land - given that 45% of Malawi’s land is either marginal or already unsuitable for 
agriculture - will average 229 nationwide by the year 2000, ranging from 96 in the north to 640 in 
the south (House and Zimalirana 1992:144). 
 
Demographic biases are also evident. Food insecurity is more prevalent and more severe in female-
centred households26 in rural Malawi than in households where the head is a resident male. One in 
four Malawian households is female-centred, but this figure rises to one in three in the Southern  
                                                          
26  This term is used to cover both de jure and de facto female-headed households, the former referring to 
households headed by a woman without a male partner (i.e. she is single, divorced or widowed), the 
latter describing households nominally headed by men who are absent for substantial periods of time, 
leaving women in effective control. 
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Region, where rural poverty is most prevalent and where 60% of female-headed households are 
poor. (Nationwide, half of all female-headed households, and one-third of male-headed households, 
are classified as poor.) Female headship and farm size are negatively correlated: 42% of holdings 
under 0.5 ha are cultivated by households headed by women (IFAD 1993:3). This tendency is 
exacerbated because small landholdings act as “a major push factor behind male migration” (Green 
with Baden 1994:20), leaving de facto female-headed households behind to cultivate tiny plots. 
 
Unlike male-headed households, many of whom have more than one wife, two thirds of female 
household heads are unmarried. Nonetheless, they tend to have high dependency ratios, averaging 
1.43 children per adult as against 0.96 in male-centred households (Cammack 1996:13).27 It is not 
surprisingly, therefore, that female-centred households suffer from severe scarcities of labour for 
both farming and off-farm income generating activities. A 1986 survey found that rural women 
work for 12 hours per day during the farming season - six hours on the farm and six hours on 
household chores such as water and firewood collection (which is increasingly time-consuming as 
population pressure and tobacco curing accelerates deforestation), child care and food preparation - 
while men work, on average, 5 hours a day - three hours farming and two hours on household 
chores. Women dominate agricultural production: “70 percent of Malawi’s full-time farmers are 
women” (Green with Baden 1994:3). Despite these excessive pressures on their time, women from 
female-centred households do more ganyu (defined here as paid agricultural labour) than women in 
male-centred households, and women generally work longer ganyu hours than men. However, they 
are typically given the most tedious and worst paid tasks, and consequently earn almost 40% less 
than men per day (Cammack 1996:23). 
 
These households are caught in a poverty trap which is familiar throughout rural Africa: being 
forced into dependence on agricultural labour on larger farms and estates during the farming 
season, which reduces their own food production, they effectively sacrifice longer term household 
food security to meet short term consumption imperatives. The problem arises because of 
inflexibilities in rural labour markets. At the household level, labour constraints are largely seasonal 
in nature. Peak labour requirements on farm occur in December and January, when labour 
productivity is lowest due to enforced rationing of food consumption and the debilitating effects of 
malaria (Cromwell 1992). But this period also coincides with peak availability of ganyu 
employment; thus ganyu competes directly with household food production. 
                                                          
27  Dependency ratios and poverty are similarly correlated, exceeding one dependent per potentially 
productive adult member for households below the 40th percentile (1.36 for households below the 
20th) and dropping to 0.92 for households above the 40th percentile (World Bank 1996:30). 
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Table 5 profiles four categories of households in rural Malawi, based on the results of participatory 
wealth ranking undertaken in two communities. Four characteristics of these households are 
described: landholding, asset ownership, income sources, and food production self sufficiency. The 
table clearly reveals the ‘poverty ratchet’ nature of life in rural Malawi. The poorest households are 
those who farm the least land, and they are also likely to have no livestock and to go hungry for 
several months each year. Except for a small minority (less than 10% in these communities), rural 
households are unable to engage in lucrative off-farm activities to compensate for their inadequate 
harvests, and it is this - rather than small landholdings and market dependence for food per se - 
which is the root cause of their chronic food insecurity. 
 
 Table 5.  Wealth Ranking in Rural Malawi 
Wealth Category Characteristics 
1. Well off 
 (Wopeza bwino) 
 Households  =  3% 
• Farm more than 2 hectares of land 
• Own cattle and other assets, such as bicycles 
• Grow tobacco and have regular off-farm incomes 
• Survive on own food production throughout the year 
2. Fairly well off 
 (Wopeza bwino pang’ono) 
 Households  =  6% 
• Farm approximately 1.5 hectares of land 
• Own goats, pigs and chickens, but no cattle 
• Have some regular source of income 
• Can afford to buy food when stocks run out 
3. Fair 
 (Wopezako) 
 Households  =  28% 
• Farm less than 0.75 hectares, but have dimba gardens 
• Own very few or no livestock 
• Petty income activities such as selling firewood 
• Market dependent for food for part of each year 
4. Poor / Worst off 
 (Wosauka / Wosowa) 
 Households  =  63% 
• Farm less than 0.2 hectares of land, no dimba garden 
• Own no livestock, except perhaps some poultry 
• No regular source of income; dependent on ganyu 
• Labour constrained - often female-headed households 
• Market dependent most of the year, with rationing 
   Source:  Adapted from Chewele et al. 1995  (combined for Mwenda and Msampha areas) 
 
The bulk of income in poor smallholder households comes from the farm, and although a 
significant proportion of income - around 30% - comes from off-farm activities, these sources are 
not lucrative enough to lift land-constrained households out of poverty. For the poorest households 
(below the 40th percentile), survey data reveal that 68% of income (including subsistence 
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production) comes from farming, 10% from paid agricultural employment (ganyu), 4% from beer 
brewing, 3% from professional work, 2% each from fishing, basket weaving and brick making, and 
the balance from unspecified sources, including remittances (World Bank 1996:44). The 
importance of off-farm income sources, with the exception of professional work, is inversely 
correlated with poverty, meaning that the poorest households depend most heavily on petty income 
generating activities such as beer brewing and basket weaving.28 
 
One reason why female-centred households tend to be poorer than male-headed households is that 
they have less labour available for farming, another is that women have less time available for 
off-farm economic activities, and a third is gendered discrimination in wages paid by employers. 
For example, during the 1992 drought, “single-parent families [left] their land to work in the tea 
estates around Mount Mulanje, even though the women and children earned wages as low as 50% 
of the male wage for casual work during the tea harvest” (Harrison 1995:130). 
 
A Rapid Food Security Assessment (‘RaFSA’) conducted in 1995 with over 20,000 households 
generated a profile of an “average rural Malawian household” (MEPD et al. 1996:15). The RaFSA 
methodology divides livelihood strategies into three clusters: ‘Self-Sufficiency Methods’, ‘Income 
Generating Activities’ and ‘Coping Strategies’. Within and between these clusters, strategies are 
ranked in terms of both order of adoption and value of contribution. 
 
Conspicuously missing from this list (though possibly subsumed under ‘selling other produce’) is 
sale of export crops. Anecdotal evidence exists from other sources of ‘illicit’ activities such as 
stealing (of dimba crops and livestock) and prostitution in both rural and urban areas (Pearce et al. 
1996:36). Although it must be emphasised that Table 6 presents a composite picture rather than 
depicting an ‘average rural Malawian household’, it is clear that livelihoods are secured through the 
pursuit of an extraordinarily diverse range of activities, debunking the popular wisdom that rural 
Malawians subsist exclusively on maize production and ganyu. While these activities are the two 
biggest single contributors to household food security, the cash income earned from ganyu is 
supplemented by a range of petty trading and other activities, while a variety of coping strategies 
(including rationing of consumption) are also routinely adopted. 
 
                                                          
28  This finding is in line with evidence on rural livelihoods throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In a recent 
review of 33 surveys from 18 countries, Reardon (1997) found that, on average, 45% of household 
income derived from non-farm rural labour market sources, even in ‘subsistence’ farming 
communities, the range being from 22% to 93%. 
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 Table 6.  Livelihood Strategies in Rural Malawian Households 
Livelihood Strategies ‘Survival Days’ 
per Month 
% Value of 
Contribution  
Self-Sufficiency Methods: 7.8      26% 
     Consumption of own harvest 6.9 23%   
     Consumption of fish caught by household 0.6 2%  
     Consumption of own livestock 0.3 1%  
Income-Generating Activities: 13.2     44% 
     Ganyu / Estate work 6.3 21%   
     Selling firewood 1.5 5%  
     Other business ventures 1.5 5%  
     Selling locally brewed beer 0.9 3%  
     Selling vegetables 0.6 2%  
     Selling fish 0.6 2%  
     Selling livestock 0.6 2%  
     Selling handicrafts/pottery 0.3 1%  
     Selling other produce 0.3 1%  
     Selling corn cakes 0.3 1%  
     Food-for-work 0.3 1%  
Coping Strategies: 9.0     30% 
     Reduced number of meals 2.1 7%  
     Consumption of premature harvest 1.8 6%  
     Meal sharing with relatives/neighbours 1.2 4%  
     Free food from government, church, donors 1.2 4%  
     Consumption of wild foods 1.2 4%  
     Loans of money or food 0.9 3%  
     Selling possessions to buy food 0.3 1%  
     Consumption of seed 0.3 1%  
  Source:  Compiled from MEPD et al. 1996:15 
 
This finding is confirmed by another in-depth household survey undertaken by Save the Children 
Fund in Salima and Mchinji Districts, which concluded that “ganyu, commonly quoted as the most 
important ‘survival’ strategy, does not appear to make as high a contribution to household food 
security as one would expect” (Pearce et al. 1996:43). The methodological lesson seems to be that 
the more detailed and disaggregated the information collected on household income sources, the 
more ganyu emerges as just one - albeit the most important - of a surprisingly large number of 
income-earning strategies. 
 
The limitation of these essentially static descriptions of the characteristics of poor households is 
their failure to capture the dynamic nature of poverty in contemporary Malawi. Population growth 
is one important process, but even more immediate is the rapidly evolving policy environment 
associated with structural adjustment reforms, which has created new patterns of opportunity and 
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marginalisation in rural areas. The frequently damaging impact of these processes on the poor and 
food insecure has motivated the introduction of ‘social safety nets’, which are discussed below. 
 
4.2. Household Food Security Interventions in Malawi 
There are a large number of chronically food insecure households in Malawi who are becoming, if 
anything, worse off under market liberalisation than before. As seen above, these vulnerable 
households are identifiable geographically, demographically and economically. However, there are 
no programmes designed specifically to improve the food security status of these households on a 
sustainable basis, only ‘social safety nets’ to assist them through the transition to a fully liberalised 
agricultural sector. The ongoing debate about ‘safety nets’ in Malawi has been characterised by a 
policy shift towards public works programmes, and a corresponding reaction against conventional 
modes of food aid delivery. 
 
• Food aid 
Food aid has played a major role in food security in Malawi over the years, both for emergency 
programmes (droughts, Mozambican refugees) and for development purposes. The 1992 drought 
relief programme delivered 200,000 MT of maize plus other commodities to drought-affected 
Malawians, at a total cost of over $100 million. Apart from emergency programmes, however, there 
is some debate over the role of non-emergency food aid as either a short-term consumption 
supplement or a long-term development tool in Malawi. 
 
A number of supplementary feeding programmes have been implemented in Malawi by NGOs and 
donors, including local church groups, UNICEF and - especially - the World Food Programme. 
Supplementary feeding programmes have targeted ‘vulnerable groups’ such as pregnant women, 
infants and destitutes, including beggars and street children. Supplementary feeding is currently 
delivered to 150,000 beneficiaries, through Nutrition Rehabilitation Units, Mother and Child Health 
Centres and Community-Based Supplementary Feeding (Brown et al. 1996:78). Although their 
humanitarian value is clear, these programmes have been relatively small in scale and limited in 
impact. As seen above, widespread chronic and seasonal undernutrition persist, and household food 
insecurity is rising. 
 
A critical evaluation of WFP’s impact in Malawi concluded that WFP’s supplementary feeding 
programme had achieved little in over twenty  years, either to reduce levels of undernutrition or to 
address the underlying causes of food insecurity (FSG 1994). As a result of this discouraging 
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finding, WFP resolved to phase out supplementary feeding and related interventions by 1998, and 
to replace these programmes with developmental uses of food aid. As a food security strategy, 
direct consumption support in the form of free food handouts will not be implemented in future, but 
will instead be restricted to food crises such as drought. Several principles for WFP involvement in 
developmental food aid in Malawi for the 1995-2000 period are listed in the Country Strategy 
Outline prepared in 1994. Three of these principles are: 
 
• Food aid should be used in ways which are “developmentally beneficial to the community”. 
• Food-for-work should augment rather than replace existing rural employment opportunities 
such as ganyu, but should be implemented in areas of large-scale unemployment. 
• Food aid should be used “in a way which is not disruptive: food is purchased in-country, except 
in times of national shortage, it is provided through existing market institutions (ADMARC or 
local traders), it is provided as a wage payment for work done on projects identified according 
to village priorities” (FSG 1994:12-15). 
 
In support of these principles, WFP has experimented since 1994 with different approaches to its 
food aid programming in Malawi. One such initiative was an agricultural development project 
which delivered free maize meal for consumption, plus credit for farming inputs such as seeds and 
fertilisers. This project had food security rather than food consumption as its primary objective, and 
it signified a major shift in WFP-Malawi’s thinking about how to address the problem of chronic 
food insecurity. It was targeted at female-headed households in rural areas, and was intended to 
provide support for three years. However, it was slow to get started, it reached relatively few 
households and the credit component suffered from high default rates. 
 
More recently, WFP-Malawi has come round to the view that a more effective delivery mechanism 
might be to tie food aid to rural employment creation, through the delivery of food to public works 
projects, and WFP is currently supporting the Malawi Social Action Fund in precisely this way 
(as discussed below). In an attempt to maximise the impact of its food aid programme, WFP has 
also moved away from its historic practice of assisting vulnerable groups in all 24 districts of 
Malawi, focusing instead on 13 ‘most vulnerable’ districts in 1996, which were reduced to eight 
districts in 1997 and will be further restricted to just six ‘chronically food deficit’ districts by 1998. 
Once these districts are selected, WFP is committed to working with local communities for up to 
10 years, in an effort to achieve sustained improvements in household food security. Criteria for 
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targeting districts include food production levels, population density, health coverage, malnutrition 
and infant mortality rates, and presence or absence of other donors and NGOs (GoM 1995b:18). 
 
• Safety nets 
All agencies involved in food security in Malawi agree that the chronically food insecure need 
some form of targeted support to assist them through the ‘transition period’ to a free market 
economy. Even the strongest supporters of rapid market liberalisation (USAID, the World Bank) 
are in favour of ‘social safety net’ interventions such as rural public works and credit programmes 
for the poorest smallholders, and have made finances available to demonstrate this commitment. 
 
Safety nets for poverty alleviation are extremely costly to implement. “At present there is no 
nationwide state safety net. ..... It is unlikely that resources could be found to fund a safety net 
program which could ensure food security for the large proportion of the Malawi population who 
are at risk” (Brown et al. 1996:78). It follows that food security for all Malawians requires a cluster 
of cost-effective programmes which are well targeted on specific vulnerable groups. However, 
targeting raises its own problems. Most NGOs claim that their target group is ‘the poorest of the 
poor’, but they concede that it is virtually impossible to target these households, and they are 
therefore forced to accept a blanket geographical coverage of projects, typically at district or 
agricultural extension planning area (‘EPA’) level.29 Perhaps for this reason, public works 
programmes have become, almost by default, the key component of all ‘safety nets’ proposals. 
Because they are self-targeting - provided the wage is set at a level low enough to discourage the 
relatively wealthy from participating - public works removes the problem of identification of the 
needy (and exclusion of the ‘non-needy’) from project administration. 
 
The Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) was set up in July 1995, as a major component of the 
Poverty Alleviation Programme which was launched by the newly elected UDF government in 
August 1994. The World Bank is providing $56 million to MASAF over five years. Of its four 
elements - which include investment in village-level infrastructure, community empowerment and 
poverty monitoring activities - the Public Works Project (PWP), with a budget of $20 million, has 
the most direct relevance to household food security. “The principle aim of the PWP is to finance a 
safety net operation in poor and food deficient areas through labour-intensive public works, such as 
                                                          
29  Recent experience - with the Supplementary Inputs Project and other interventions - suggests that 
targeting below the EPA level is politically and logistically unfeasible in Malawi. In a context of 
extreme and widespread poverty, it is both extremely difficult and politically divisive to selectively 
identify some community members as beneficiaries and to exclude others. 
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roads, bridges, small-scale irrigation schemes.... The works undertaken under this program will 
generate significant employment opportunities at the rural minimum wage so as to operate a safety 
net for those who have no alternative income-earning opportunity” (MASAF 1996:15). 
 
The Public Works Project was piloted in 1996 and expected to move to full implementation during 
1997. The PWP operates only in food deficit rural areas of Malawi, and it explicitly targets women 
for employment, “since female-headed households make up a disproportionate share of the poorest” 
(MASAF 1996:16). Similarly, WFP-Malawi is “positively discriminating in favour of projects that 
have a large proportion of women working in or benefiting from them” (Cammack 1996:50). About 
60% of participants on WFP-Malawi’s food-for-work projects in 1996 were women. In view of the 
heavy pressures on women’s time in rural Malawi (as noted above), questions should surely be 
raised as to whether the labour requirement on public works projects is acceptable or whether it 
constitutes an excessive additional burden on women who are already overworked. A related 
negative feature of the labour requirement is that it excludes all vulnerable groups who are unable 
to work, whether through age (being either too young or too old), illness or disability, pregnancy, 
domestic commitments such as child care, or cultural constraints on women working outside the 
home. The implicit assumption that public works food or income will ‘trickle down’, through 
intra-household redistribution, to all those who cannot participate directly is deeply questionable, 
and for this reason public works should not be seen as a comprehensive rural safety net in its own 
right. 
 
An innovative proposal on MASAF’s Public Works Projects is that wages be paid in either cash or 
food, according to preferences expressed by participants on each project. If payment is requested in 
the form of cash wages, this would financed with World Bank money; if in food, this would be 
provided by WFP. This allows the method of payment to vary both spatially and temporally, 
according to demand. Projects located near the Mozambique border (where food can be purchased 
cheaply all year round) and in food surplus areas are expected to request payment in cash, while 
those located in remote areas far from markets and major roads are likely to favour food, as market 
supplies are uncertain and maize prices can be high. Modes of payment can also vary seasonally: 
after the harvest when food is plentiful, cash for non-food purchases will generally be preferred, but  
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in the dry season and the months preceding the harvest, when food is scarce and expensive, food (or 
coupons for a fixed quantity of food) are more likely to be requested.30 
 
Despite these positive developments, a number of fundamental questions remain unresolved. It is 
not yet clear what coverage of food insecure households public works projects will actually 
achieve. Even if significant numbers are reached, substantially more will certainly be excluded. 
A related question concerns how long safety net programmes are likely to be needed, which 
requires a judgement about how long the ‘transition period’ is expected to last. Some observers 
doubt that a time will ever be reached when safety nets could be ‘safely’ removed. Finally, it might 
be argued that safety nets are a rather defeatist option, and that if there is any danger of their 
becoming institutionalised as a de facto rural social welfare programme, then this is inferior to 
alternative interventions that might be implemented to generate sustainable off-farm incomes. 
 
• Alternative incomes 
Smallholders in Malawi are increasingly unable to meet their subsistence needs through domestic 
maize production, but their growing dependence on the market for staple food implies rising 
household food insecurity, since it has not been matched by rising incomes. Sahn and 
Arulpragasam (1991) found that real wages and off-farm employment opportunities were 
stagnating in rural areas, and more recent evidence on the income effects of policy reforms during 
the 1990s is inconclusive. Although the government and major donors remain focused on 
agriculture as the dominant source of livelihood security and prosperity in rural Malawi, NGOs and 
others see the future survival of Malawi’s poor and food insecure as lying with enhanced off-farm 
income-earning opportunities. “The general view among NGOs, if not among donors, is that food 
security for the poorest is linked more to the diversification of their income base than to the 
increased production of staple food on an ever decreasing agricultural base” (Henry 1996:9). 
 
Recently, as discussed above, several qualitative surveys have established that off-farm income 
sources in Malawi are more diverse than was previously thought. Many income-generating 
activities are practised in rural areas apart from ganyu. Though few of these activities can be  
                                                          
30  These innovations could represent a breakthrough in the design of food- and cash-for-work projects. 
Much of the literature on public works or ‘employment-based safety nets’ has debated the respective 
merits of paying project participants in food or in cash. The obvious and fairest solution - simply 
asking participants what they prefer - has either not occurred to project planners or has been dismissed 
as impractical. Typically, payment in food is the only option on WFP projects, and collaboration 
between WFP and the World Bank in this regard is extremely unusual. 
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described as lucrative, they do generate amounts of cash that are significant in food security terms, 
especially for the poorest households which are most likely to adopt them. Also, most alternatives 
to ganyu are less likely to be seasonal and directly competitive with farm labour requirements. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a growing recognition that more lucrative off-farm income sources must be 
found and supported in rural areas. A number of micro-enterprise projects are operational in rural 
areas, often under NGO auspices. Rural credit schemes are being run by Malawi Rural Finance 
Corporation (600 women’s groups of 20-25 members each by mid-1996, for off-farm income-
generating activities) and by GTZ (‘Promotion of Micro-Enterprises for Rural Women’). However, 
these project interventions tend to have limited impact, since they reach only participants and their 
families. (A similar critique can be levelled at MASAF’s Public Works Project.) In the long run, 
household food security in Malawi will be achieved not through micro-projects or even by a more 
diversified agriculture, but through the development of a vibrant and fully diversified economy, one 
which offers a variety of employment opportunities in both rural and urban areas. 
 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Notwithstanding the accumulating body of literature on national and household food security issues 
in Malawi, significant gaps remain in published knowledge concerning critical aspects of food 
security, especially at the smallholder household and intra-household levels. Many assertions are 
circulated as facts about agriculture and food security in Malawi which, more often than not, are 
not grounded in hard empirical evidence. These include generalisations about the importance of 
off-farm labour (“ganyu is the primary coping strategy for food deficit households”), land scarcity 
(“shortage of land is the major constraint on smallholder production”), and the impact of structural 
adjustment on the rural poor (“the poorest of the poor live in a barter economy, so they are hardly 
affected at all by market liberalisation”).31 Assertions such as these have profound implications for 
the conceptualisation of household food insecurity in Malawi, and hence for food security planning 
and interventions. It is therefore vital that these assumptions and beliefs are rigorously tested and 
verified or rejected. Specific research is needed into the issues identified below. The information 
derived from such research, including monitoring the impact of market liberalisation on the food 
insecure, could decisively influence thinking and policy on food security in Malawi. 
                                                          
31 Variants on these statements were made to the author in conversations with government, donors and 
NGOs in Lilongwe in June 1996. 
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• Ganyu 
The debate about rural labour markets in Malawi is confusing. One view is that there is excess 
demand for agricultural labour on wealthier farms and estates, suggesting that ganyu is always 
available for those who want it. Even in difficult years, ganyu “seems to have an amazing capacity 
to expand” (Earl and Moseley 1996:7). If this is true, then the rural labour market provides a 
flexible safety net for those households who need cash or food urgently, because of drought or 
seasonal hunger. The counter-argument is that this view is simplistic, for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, if there is excess demand for labour, why don’t wage rates (which are generally below the 
rural minimum wage) rise to equilibrate demand and supply? One suggestion is that ganyu is 
offered as a form of ‘welfare’ or patronage by large farmers to their poorer neighbours, rather than 
being purely market determined (Pearce et al. 1996:27). It seems more plausible that, because of 
the lack of alternative employment opportunities, either in rural or urban areas, the supply of ganyu 
labour typically exceeds demand, despite the low wages it offers. Secondly, rural labour markets 
are highly fragmented, both spatially and temporally - in some villages, people have to walk 
15-20 kilometres to the nearest estate, which is a considerable disincentive; and employment 
opportunities are highly seasonal, peaking in October to January. Thirdly, agricultural labouring 
constitutes a poverty trap, since it competes with labour needs for smallholder farm production. 
This last argument is supported by recent evidence suggesting that smallholder households already 
face severe labour constraints in farming their own fields (Pearce et al. 1996). 
 
Given this confusion over the role of ganyu in either alleviating or exacerbating poverty and food 
insecurity in poor households, field research on ganyu in Malawi seems to be urgently needed. 
Fieldwork would focus on the availability of ganyu (by season, gender, geographical area and in 
drought years), remuneration (cash, food and other payments, gender differentials), conditions of 
employment (hours worked, benefits, distance, travel costs), and household food security impact 
(the popular assertion that ganyu diverts household labour from subsistence farming is unproven - 
if one adult goes for ganyu while the others farm their own land, ganyu income might be additional, 
not competitive). Specific research questions would include: 
 
• Which forms of ganyu are available all year round, and which are concentrated only in seasons 
which compete with household food production? 
• How effective is ganyu in bridging food consumption deficits in poor households? 
• Is the demand for ganyu expandable (even in drought years), or is it strictly limited? 
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• How are opportunities and wage rates for ganyu evolving in response to market liberalisation? 
 
• Intra-household food security issues32 
An increasing amount of information is becoming available on rural Malawian households - their 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, their sources of food and coping mechanisms during 
droughts. Much less is known about what happens within the household in relation to food security, 
in terms of the gendered division of domestic duties and economically productive activities, pooling 
of individual incomes, asset ownership and inheritance practices across genders and generations. 
Specific research questions to investigate include the following: 
 
• For which specific aspects of food production, provision, processing and preparation are men 
and women individually or jointly responsible? 
• Which categories of income are open only to men and only to women, and which are accessible 
to both men and women (e.g. cash cropping, ganyu, dimba, trading)? 
• Is cash or food income earned by individual household members owned and controlled by the 
individual, or is it generally pooled and shared? 
• Are specific assets owned exclusively by male or female household members, and to whom are 
assets transferred on the death of the owner (e.g. does livestock owned or land farmed by a 
male household head pass to his widow, his sons or his brothers)? 
• Are agricultural inputs and other resources transferred to ‘households’ used for the benefit of 
the entire household or by individual members, and does it make any difference which 
household member receives and controls these resources? 
 
• Other research issues 
There are many other topics which are highly relevant to household food security in Malawi about 
which little detailed information is available, which might be responsible for unfounded assertions 
and poor programming decisions. These topics include: crop production and consumption diversity, 
secondary incomes and the ‘barter economy’, seasonality, and land availability: 
 
                                                          
32 The Nyasaland Nutrition Survey of 1938-39, the results of which were first published more than fifty 
years later (Berry and Petty, 1992), provides a wide-ranging source of information about food 
production and consumption issues in the colonial period, at both the household and intra-household 
levels. This survey could provide a methodological model for research on similar issues today. 
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• Diversity of crop production (intercropping, dimba) and secondary food sources (spinach 
plants, fruits, roots and tubers, minor pulses); 
• Food security uses of secondary food crops such as pulses, tubers and fruits (are they 
consumed, sold, or bartered for grain?); 
• Nature and value of secondary income activities (beer brewing, cooked food, etc.); 
• Scale and significance of the ‘barter economy’ among the poorest of the poor; 
• Seasonality (incomes, sources of food, migration patterns, market prices). 
• The ‘land debate’ - is land the binding constraint on smallholder production, or are labour and 
other inputs more critical? (Is there really a ‘Malthusian crisis’ in rural Malawi?) 
 
• Monitoring the impact of market liberalisation 
A major applied research question in Malawi concerns the impact of ongoing agricultural policy 
changes on the food security status of poor, marginal households. The evidence reviewed above 
suggests that some groups are becoming better off while others are worse off than before - there are 
winners and losers from every process of change. An appropriate and important role for researchers 
might be to identify the ‘losers’ in the market liberalisation process, and for NGOs to undertake an 
advocacy role on behalf of these people throughout the duration of the ‘transitional period’. NGOs 
might also monitor the impact of liberalisation on vulnerable households in their own geographical 
activity areas, to determine whether, when and how local incomes and food security status start to 
improve. Results of this informal monitoring could be disseminated verbally through Malawi’s 
Food Security Network.33 Alternatively, a more formal monitoring system could be established, 
with regular (monthly or quarterly) questionnaires administered to a sample of vulnerable 
households on issues relating to food security and market liberalisation, the results being published 
in a Bulletin and circulated among government, donors and NGOs. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
As the preceding discussion has shown, major policy processes have been set in motion in rural 
Malawi which affect livelihoods profoundly, but the impacts of these policy changes are 
differentiated between and within rural households, and are strongly contested among observers and 
stakeholders. Supporters of agricultural reform argue that liberalisation is having beneficial effects 
on the agricultural sector in Malawi as a whole, through enhanced price incentives to producers and 
                                                          
33  The Food Security Network is a consortium of individuals representing relevant government ministries, 
donors and NGOs, who meet regularly in Lilongwe to discuss food security policy and related issues. 
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traders, and that this will ultimately impact favourably on even the poorest smallholders - either 
directly, as many of them now enjoy higher incomes through growing tobacco and other crops for 
sale, or indirectly, since wealthier farmers have increased their demand for labour and are spending 
more money in rural areas. 
 
Critics argue that households which are not producing food surpluses or export crops will not 
benefit from higher output prices and can only suffer from higher input prices. Deficit farmers also 
face higher prices for the food that they must purchase for several months each year. Moreover, all 
farmers face a more uncertain and riskier policy environment. Prices for export crops fluctuate from 
one year to the next, food price banding is a relatively ineffective and probably temporary 
intervention, and the future role of ADMARC vis-à-vis private traders remains unclear. These 
observers doubt that ongoing processes of agricultural reform will end with improved livelihoods 
for the poorest Malawians. They argue that poverty and household food insecurity can never be 
reduced by market liberalisation policies which result in price rises that further restrict the access of 
the rural poor to inputs and food, and do not address the many other constraints they face. 
 
The possibility that the poorest Malawians may be worse off following economic reforms than 
before meets with two responses from supporters of market liberalisation. The first argument is that 
the ‘poorest of the poor’ live mainly in a barter economy, so that changes in prices of agricultural 
inputs or food have very little effect on them anyway. The second is to concede that some people 
will become worse off as a consequence of market liberalisation - but only in the short run, for a 
‘transitional period’. These groups of people should be assisted through the transition with safety 
nets such as public works projects, which will transfer resources to them in the form of cash or 
food, and protect their food consumption levels. 
 
A real concern, though, given the rather modest ambitions of these interventions, is that they could 
allow the government and donors to adopt a permanently ‘welfarist’ attitude towards the poorest of 
the poor. As with other ‘transitional’ interventions of this nature, once safety net programmes are in 
place they will almost certainly need to become permanent, given the reality in Malawi of recurrent 
droughts, inexorable population growth and land scarcity, and limited nonagricultural employment 
opportunities. Given this context - which is independent of the adjustment policies which safety 
nets are designed to redress - the danger is that mass poverty and accelerating impoverishment will 
become accepted as a fact of life, not something to be challenged and eradicated through public 
policy. The long run social cost of this acceptance is the development of a Malawian underclass to 
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whom the benefits of economic reform trickle down, if at all, only in the form of charity from 
donors and the state. 
 
Whatever their other differences, there is general agreement among policy-makers and agencies that 
Malawi should continue to pursue the goal of self-sufficiency in maize for as long as possible. If 
this approach to national food security is supported, a focus on high potential agricultural areas is 
suggested, rather than on drought-prone and marginal areas. But if the primary concern is to protect 
and enhance household food security, this suggests a focus on chronically food insecure areas. In 
either case, given the limited range and value of non-agricultural incomes, increases in food 
production are obviously important. Maxwell’s ‘walking on two legs, but with one leg longer than 
the other’ strategy might be most appropriate: promoting productivity increases in high potential 
areas (by distributing hybrid maize seed and fertiliser for free, subsidised or on credit); while 
simultaneously promoting drought-tolerant food crops (sorghum, cassava) in marginal areas. The 
dual objectives are to raise food production in relatively food secure (high potential) areas and to 
stabilise food production in food insecure (drought-prone) areas. 
 
However, this paper has also attempted to demonstrate that intensification and diversification 
within agriculture are not adequate in the longer term. Deepening resource constraints (especially, 
but not only, land), the limits to technological innovation, weak markets, recurrent droughts and 
covariate risks (between food and export crop production) together mean that agriculture cannot 
continue to provide livelihoods indefinitely to over 80% of Malawi’s rapidly growing population. 
Alternative income-generating opportunities urgently need to be found if sustainable reductions in 
rural poverty and food insecurity are to be achieved. Unfortunately, how, when and even whether 
this will be achieved is currently a source of pessimism rather than hope. 
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